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Accounting for Competition, 
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Understanding the relationship between the institutionalisation 
of competitive tendering, governance, budgetary policies and 
accountability has relevance for practitioners and policy makers 
interested in using management accounting and control sys-
tems to improve accountability among institutional actors and 
between organisations. 
This doctoral thesis presents research that analyses this within 
organisations and examines the relevance of an institutionalised 
management accounting policy in negotiating relationships 
between organisations. 
The theoretical aim is to extend the institutional framework 
of management accounting change proposed by Burn and 
Scapens (2000). The framework shows how institutional change 
processes occur within an organisation. Further theorisation is 
needed to analyse the relationship between the institutionalisa-
tion process, power and accountability among organisational 
actors and the role of management accounting information in 
negotiating order between organisations. The research uses a 
multiple theory approach, which provides effective conceptual 
tools to analyse how institutional actors think and act from dif-
ferent perspectives and in different settings. 
The empirical part of the thesis uses intensive field studies in 
public and not-for-profit health care organisations and a munici-
pality in Finland. The organisations analysed have institutionalised 
competitive tendering, governance and budgetary policies. 
Findings are presented in four essays that support the theoreti-
cal reasoning of the thesis with practical policy implications. The 
main theoretical contributions are to show how and why the 
institutionalisation of competitive tendering, governance and 
budgetary policies cannot be taken for granted per se to shape 
the ways in which institutional actors think and act in account-
ability and in negotiating order with other organisations.
The studies in this thesis are interesting for readers 
working in other organisations because they show how 
institutional actors think and act in accountability and 
in negotiating relationships with other organisations 
during the on-going financial crisis with impacts on 
competitive tendering, governance and budgetary poli-
cies at organisational level. 
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Abstract 
 
 
Purpose 
 
The aim of this thesis1 is to analyse theoretically how institutionalisation of competitive 
tendering2, governance and budgetary policies cannot be taken for granted to lead to 
accountability among institutional actors3. The nature of an institutionalised management 
accounting policy, its relevance as a source of power in organisational decision making, 
and in negotiating inter-organisational relationships, are also analysed. 
 
 
Practical motivation 
 
The practical motivation of the thesis is to show how practitioners and policy makers can 
institutionalise changes which improve the power of management accounting and control 
systems4 as a mechanism of accountability among institutional actors and in negotiating 
relationships with other organisations.  
 
 
Theoretical motivation and conceptual approach 
 
The theoretical motivation of the thesis is to extend the institutional framework of 
management accounting change proposed by Burns and Scapens (2000) by using the 
theories of critical realism, communicative action, negotiated order and the framework of 
circuits of power.  The Burns and Scapens framework needs further theorisation to 
analyse the relationship between the institutionalisation of management accounting and 
accountability; and the relevance of management accounting information in negotiating in 
inter-organisational relationships.   
 
 
Methodology and field studies 
 
Field research took place in public and not-for-profit health care organisations and a 
municipality in Finland from 2008 to 2013. Data were gathered by document analysis, 
interviews, participation in meetings and observations.  
 
Findings 
The findings are explained in four different essays that show that institutionalisation of 
competitive tendering, governance and budgetary policies cannot be taken for granted to 
lead to accountability among institutional actors.  
                                                
1 The term ‘thesis’ is used to refer to this doctoral research project as a whole. The term ‘study’ is used to refer 
to each essay or part thereof.  
 
2 Competitive tendering is a procurement method to outsource goods and services. For further details, see: 
Bergman, M. A. and S. Lundberg (2013), 'Tender evaluation and supplier selection methods in public 
procurement'. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 73-83. 
 
3 This thesis uses the term ‘institutional actors’ to refer to persons who are involved in the institutionalisation 
of a specific management accounting change policy. 
 
4 Management accounting and control systems are accounting based mechanisms that organisations use to 
motivate, influence and control actions and conduct of stakeholders such as employees, managers and 
customers. For further details, see: Macintosh, N. B. and P. Quattrone (2010), Management accounting and 
control systems: An organizational and sociological approach, 2 edn., ( J. Wiley., New York).   
 
 
iii 
The ways by which institutional actors think and act can be influenced by other 
institutional mechanisms, such as inter-organisational circuits of power and intra-
organisational governance policies, independent of the institutional change process. The 
relevance of institutionalised management accounting policies in negotiating 
relationships between two or more organisations depends on processes and contexts 
through which institutional actors use management accounting information as a tool of 
communication, mutual understanding and power.  
 
Research limitations / implications  
 
The theoretical framework used can be applied validly in other studies. The empirical 
findings cannot be generalised directly to other organisations than the organisations 
analysed.  
 
 
Practical implications 
  
Competitive tendering and budgetary policies can be institutionalised to shape actions of 
institutional actors within an organisation. To lead to accountability, practitioners and 
policy makers should implement governance policies that increase the use of 
management accounting information in institutional actors’ thinking, actions and 
responsibility for their actions. To reach a negotiated order between organisations, 
institutionalised management accounting policies should be used as one of the tools of 
communication aiming to reach mutual agreement among institutional actors.  
 
 
Keywords 
 
Accountability, Budgeting, Ceremonial, Circuits of power, Competitive tendering, 
Governance, Institutional change, Instrumental, Management accounting, Negotiated 
order, Health care, Public sector organisations
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iv 
Abstract in Swedish  
 
 
Avhandlingens syfte 
 
Syftet med avhandlingen är att analysera om en institutionalisering av konkurrensutsatt 
upphandling, förvaltarstyrning och riktlinjer för budgetering kan leda till ökat 
redovisningsansvar bland institutionella aktörer inom hälsovårdssektorn. Avhandlingen 
granskar också hur relevant institutionaliserad ekonomistyrningsinformation är i rådande 
maktstrukturer när beslut fattas inom organisationer och i affärsförhandlingar mellan 
organisationer. 
 
 
Teoretiska motiv 
 
Den teoretiska motiveringen för avhandlingen är utveckla Burns och Scapens (2000) 
institutionella ramverk för konceptualisering av förändring inom ekonomistyrning 
genom att använda teorier om ‘critical realism’, ‘communicative action’, ‘negotiated order’ och 
‘framework of circuits of power’. Burns och Scapens ramverket kompletteras med en mera 
bredare och mera ingående teoretisk analys för att granska förhållandet mellan 
institutionaliserad ekonomistyrning och redovisningsansvar för att förstå den relevans 
ekonomistyrningsinformation har i affärsförhandlingar mellan organisationer. 
 
 
Praktiska motiv 
 
Avhandlingen vill visa för ledningen i organisationer inom sjukvård och för politiska 
beslutsfattare med förvaltaransvar hur förändringar kan institutionaliseras för att stärka 
effekterna av ekonomistyrnings- och kontrollsystem i syfte att förtydliga 
redovisningsansvar för institutionella aktörer och i affärsrelationer med andra 
organisationer. 
 
 
Datainsamling 
 
Fältstudierna genomfördes i offentliga och icke vinstdrivande hälsovårdsorganisationer 
och en kommun i Finland under perioden 2008-2013. Informationen samlades genom 
dokumentanalys, intervjuer, deltagandet i möten och personliga observationer. 
 
 
Resultat 
 
Resultaten redogörs i fyra olika uppsatser. Uppsatserna visar att det inte är givet att 
institutionalisering av konkurrensutsättning, förvaltarstyrning och riktlinjer för 
budgetering leder till tydligare redovisningsansvar bland institutionella aktörer. Sättet på 
vilka institutionella aktörer tänker och agerar kan påverkas av andra institutionella 
mekanismer, såsom maktförhållanden inom organisationer och olika förvaltningsseder 
mellan organisationer, vilka kan vara oberoende av den institutionella 
förändringsprocessen. Relevansen av institutionaliserade riktlinjer för ekonomistyrning i 
affärsförhandlingar mellan två eller flera organisationer beror på processer och kontexter 
genom vilka institutionella aktörer använder ekonomistyrningsinformation som ett 
verktyg för kommunikation, ömsesidig förståelse och maktutövande.   
Det teoretiska ramverket som avhandlingen utvecklat kan tillämpas i andra typer av 
organisationer för att se om de empiriska resultaten kan överföras till andra 
sammanhang. 
 
 
 
v 
Praktiska implikationer 
 
Konkurrensutsättning och riktlinjer för budgetering inom offentliga organisationer kan 
institutionaliseras för att påverka hur institutionella aktörer agerar inom sina 
organisationer. För att leda till tydligare redovisningsansvar borde ledningen och 
beslutfattare inom hälsovården implementera förvaltarstyrning som stärker 
användningen av ekonomistyrningsinformation i sina verksamheter. För att lyckas i 
affärsförhandlingar mellan organisationer, bör institutionaliserade riktlinjer för 
ekonomistyrning användas som ett av kommunikationsverktygen med målet att nå 
ömsesidiga överenskommelser bland institutionella aktörer. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, institutional theory has had a major impact on research in a wide 
variety of fields within social sciences, including … accounting. (Scapens and 
Varoutsa 2010, p. 314) 
 
A wide body of literature has used institutional theory to analyse institutionalisation of 
management accounting and control systems within organisations (Coyte et al., 2010; 
Lucas and Rafferty, 2008; Lukka, 2007) and between organisations (Coad and Cullen, 
2006; Hyvönen and Järvinen, 2006; Scapens and Varoutsa 2010). These studies have been 
inspired by an institutional framework proposed by Burns and Scapens (2000). The 
framework provides conceptual tools to analyse the intra-institutional process, that is, a 
process taking place within an institution, through which management accounting rules 
and routines become institutionalised or ‘taken for granted’ by institutional actors (Burns 
and Scapens, 2000).  Burns and Scapens (2000, p.4 and p. 20) recommend that their 
framework be extended to analyse relationships among management accounting change 
and other areas of organisational life. Scapens and Varoutsa (2010) also recommend 
extension of the Burns and Scapens framework to institutional change taking place 
between two or more organisations.  
 
Previous studies have extended the Burns and Scapens framework to the theory of power 
(Burns, 2000; Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006; Yazdifar et al., 2008), new institutional sociology 
(Lukka, 2007), sociology of knowledge (Busco et al., 2006) and old institutional economics 
(Lucas and Rafferty, 2008) in analysing the intra-institutional process of resistance to 
change and the relationship between institutional change and stability. The gap in the 
literature is how the institutionalisation of management accounting change affects the 
ways in which institutional actors use the institutionalised tools of management 
accounting to give accounts of their actions or conduct to their hierarchy (Broadbent and 
Guthrie, 2008; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013; Greiling and Spraul, 2010). In other words, 
how does the institutionalisation of management accounting change improve 
accountability among institutional actors? 
 
Accountability is a process of asking and giving accounts for conduct between or among 
at least two persons or organisations (Broadbent et al., 1996; Roberts and Scapens, 1985). 
Accountability is a broad concept that can be used in different contexts to mean different 
things (Mulgan, 2000; Sinclair, 1995; Stewart, 1984). Giving an account for conduct, 
however, involves telling about oneself (Roberts, 2009). Telling about oneself leads to a 
contrast between disclosing accountability and being accountable for one’s actions and 
conducts (Butler, 2005; Greiling and Spraul, 2010; Messner, 2009). Accounting and 
operational information act as raw material of accountability (Broadbent and Laughlin, 
2013; Greiling and Spraul, 2010; Stewart, 1984) and governance (Almquist et al., 2012; 
Brennan and Solomon, 2008; Shaoul et al., 2012). Governance is the work of leading an 
organisation that involves setting goals and using power to monitor their implementation 
(Hyndman and McDonnell, 2009). The gap in the literature is about how business sector 
organisations use management accounting and operational information as strategic power 
(Carter et al., 2010) to win competitive tendering in public sector organisations and how 
procurement contracts concluded afterwards affect accountability of public decision 
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2 
makers for the use of public funds to outsource goods and services (Argento et al., 2010; 
Grossi and Mussari, 2008). Power is the capacity of a person or organisation to influence 
the thoughts and actions of another person or organisation in a way that person or 
organisation would not do otherwise (Collier, 2001; Liguori, 2012; Lukes, 1974). Power 
becomes strategic when it can be used to attend a well defined goal (Carter et al., 2010). 
Therefore, a theme of this thesis is to analyse the relationship between the 
institutionalisation process, power and accountability among institutional actors and 
between organisations. 
  
 
 
3 
 
 
 
2. Theoretical Framework, Aim of the Thesis and Research 
Questions 
 
 
The Burns and Scapens framework is based on various aspects of institutional and 
structuration theories (Scapens and Varoutsa 2010). Structuration theory focuses on the 
relationship between structures, that is, formal processes or frameworks; and agencies, 
that is, social practices (Giddens, 1984). The main criticism against structuration theory is 
based on its conceptual assumption that agency and structure reproduce each other (i.e., 
the duality of structure).5 Institutional theory has different branches that apply different 
ontological assumptions (Johansson and Siverbo, 2009). This section gives an overview of 
different branches of institutional theory, before explaining gaps in the Burns and Scapens 
framework, the aim of the thesis, further theorisation and research questions. 
 
 
2.1. Background: different branches of institutional theory 
 
A theory is a set of inter-related concepts, useful to explaining a research issue (Ahrens 
and Chapman, 2006). Institutional theory has three main branches: old institutional 
economics (OIE), new institutional economics (NIE), and new institutional sociology 
(NIS). A common feature of all branches of institutional theory is the relevance of 
institutions and institutional contexts in analysing organisations and decision-making 
processes within organisations (Hodgson, 2006; Scapens and Varoutsa 2010).  
 
OIE emerged in the late 1890s from American scholars including Torstein Veblen, Wesley 
Mitchell, John R. Common and Clarence Ayres (Hodgson, 1993). The founders of OIE 
criticised neoclassical economic explanations of organisational change by using atomistic 
assumptions of economic rationality and equilibrium (Rutherford, 2000). OIE argues that 
organisational change is evolutionary and that organisations go through an intra-
institutional process of change that is necessary to adapt to changing contexts of 
organisational life (Johansson and Siverbo, 2009). The cornerstone of OIE is that 
continuous duplication and reproduction of new institutional policies within an 
organisation lead to taken for granted ways of thinking and acting of institutional actors 
when the institutional change has been accomplished (Burns and Scapens, 2000; Scapens 
and Varoutsa 2010; Veblen, 1898; 1919). In this setting, an institutionalised change 
becomes an institution, that is, ‘a way of thought or action of some prevalence and 
permanence which is embedded in the habits of a group or the customs of a people’ 
(Hamilton, 1932, p.84).  
 
Critics of OIE argue that OIE is not a theory because it does not provide alternative ways 
to analyse organisational change beyond economics assumptions of bounded rationality 
and equilibrium (Langlois, 1989).  
                                                
5 For further discussion, see: Downey, S. (2005), 'From simulation model to critique of structuration'. Structure 
and Dynamics, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 1-27. 
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4 
Recent studies have reiterated the theoretical status of OIE in a less radical way and have 
called for further studies applying OIE in analysing the institutionalisation of 
management accounting change that takes place between organisations (Johansson and 
Siverbo, 2009; Scapens and Varoutsa 2010).   
 
Coase (1937) developed NIE in the 1920s. NIE tries to avoid the criticism levelled at OIE 
by analysing institutions as an outcome of bounded rationalities that guide the 
neoclassical economic school of thoughts (Hodgson, 1993). NIE conceptualises institutions 
as exogenous, that is, a body of external rules and norms that constrain and shape 
individual behaviour. In contrast, OIE treats institutions as endogenous, that is, 
representing taken for granted ways of thinking and acting by institutional actors 
(Rutherford, 2000). NIE has given rise to various theories, such as transaction cost 
economics, agency theory and game theory, that are applied in a variety of fields such as 
common law, human rights, public administration, performance management and 
economics (Scapens and Varoutsa 2010).  
 
NIS was developed in the late 1970s following a lengthy philosophical debate on the 
relationship between organisational formal structure, processes and practices (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983). Meyer and Rowan (1977), founding fathers of NIS, use sociology to 
argue that organisations adopt new procedures and processes in order to achieve 
legitimacy (i.e., stakeholder acceptance) and secure resources that they need (i.e., resource 
dependency). The rationale behind institutional change from a NIS perspective is a search 
for legitimacy and resources (Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006). Macro institutional pressures for 
change go beyond customer and supplier relationships to include social norms and 
cultural rules. As a consequence, organisations that operate in similar environments tend 
to have similar organisational structures and processes (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). NIS 
defines an institution as ‘a reciprocal typification of habitualised action by types actors 
overtime’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, p.54).  Oliver (1991) extends NIS to strategic 
management and argues that organisations act strategically to respond to macro and 
micro environmental pressures for change. As a consequence, organisations can adopt 
formal structure and processes in order to secure their legitimacy but without changing 
their informal ways of acting in practice (Oliver, 1991). Tolbert and Zucker (1999) use 
structuration theory, however, to criticise the strategic perspective of NIS because an 
institutionalised structure, such as an institutionalised management accounting policy, 
should generate action. More recently, NIS has come closer to OIE by analysing when and 
how institutional change takes place at micro and macro organisational levels (Scapens 
and Varoutsa 2010).  
 
 
2.2. The Burns and Scapens (2000) framework 
 
Burns and Scapens (2000) took inspiration from OIE (Scapens, 1994), some features of NIS 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977) and structuration theory (Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Giddens, 
1984). Although structuration theory is not an institutional theory, it can be used to study 
institutional change processes (Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Dillard et al., 2004; Seal et al., 
2004).  
 
Burns and Scapens (2000) replaced the concept of structure with the OIE concept of 
institution and suggested a framework to analyse how management accounting rules and 
routines become institutionalised within an organisation.  
 
 
5 
Rules are formal prescriptions about how things should be done. Routines represent 
thoughts and actions adopted by groups of people and applied at individual level (Burns 
and Scapens, 2000). The core argument in the framework is that the institutionalised rules 
and routines form an institution when assumptions about how things are done in practice 
have become taken for granted by institutional actors regardless of resistance to change 
encountered in the institutionalisation process (Burns and Scapens, 2000).  
 
Burns and Scapens (2000) used institutional dichotomies, such as ceremonial and 
instrumental values and evolutionary and revolutionary change, to illustrate the outcome 
of the institutionalisation process. A value reflects how individuals think and act under 
circumstances that might not be within their control (Bush, 1987). Ceremonial value gives 
rise to behavioural patterns that prescribe status, reinforce principal and agent 
relationships, and legitimise the use of power by one group of people over another when 
there are ‘sufficient reasons’ or ‘plausible arguments’ to do so (Bush, 1987, p.5). 
Instrumental value uses the best available tools, skills and knowledge to solve problems 
faced by an organisation in which the change has taken (or is taking) place. The test of any 
instrumental use of accounting information is whether the information is used to solve 
organisational problems efficiently even when that requires a shift in power relationships 
between or within organisations (Bush, 1987, p.6-7). At an institutional level, Dugger 
(1990, p.426) advised testing institutional change by analysing whether the change ‘helps 
the community even at the expense of self,’ an instrumental change; or ‘helps the self even 
at the expense of the community,’ a ceremonial change. Institutional change is 
evolutionary when the change evolves gradually. In the contrary scenario, that is, when 
new institutional rules replace old rules and routines radically and rapidly, the change is 
revolutionary (Johansson and Siverbo, 2009). As a consequence, evolutionary and 
revolutionary changes reflect the pace of an institutional change rather than its outcome 
per-se (Liguori, 2012; Liguori and Steccolini, 2011).  
 
Previous management accounting and control studies that applied the Burns and Scapens 
(2000) framework did not question how the institutionalisation of management 
accounting rules and routines affects the accountability of institutional actors in 
organisations that have complex hierarchies (Hyvönen and Järvinen, 2006; Macinati, 2010; 
Nyland et al., 2009). Moreover, although Lukka (2007) showed that institutionalised 
management accounting rules remain loosely coupled with old management accounting 
routines, his study did not question the taken for granted assumption in the Burns and 
Scapens (2000) framework that institutionalised rules shape the ways organisational 
actors think and act.  
 
 
2.3. Aim of the thesis 
 
The aim of the thesis is to extend the Burns and Scapens (2000) framework by analysing 
how the institutionalisation of management accounting rules and routines cannot be 
taken for granted to lead to accountability between institutional actors. The nature of an 
institutionalised accounting policy, its relevance in organisational decision making and in 
negotiating inter-organisational relationships will also be analysed. The thesis extends the 
Burns and Scapens framework to accounting for competition in inter-organisational 
settings (Scapens and Varoutsa 2010) by analysing how institutionalisation of competitive 
tendering takes place in public sector organisation and effects on accountability among 
public decision makers for the use of public funds to outsource goods and services.  
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2.4. Further theorisation and research questions 
 
The studies in this thesis use a multiple theory approach, which is recommended in 
accounting research because it overcomes limits of conceptual assumptions that underlie 
a single theory (Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008; Lukka, 2010). First, the studies use the 
theory of critical realism to analyse the relationship between institutionalisation of 
governance, budgetary policies and accountability. Critical realism is selected because it 
provides conceptual tools to analyse the nature of the institutional change in context and 
its effects on how institutional actors think and react to change (Bhaskar, 2011; Reed, 
2005). Second, the theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1984; 1987) is used to 
analyse the relevance of communicative rationalities to the institutionalisation of 
budgetary accountability among institutional actors. Third, the framework of circuits of 
power (Clegg, 1989) is used to analyse how mechanisms of power affect the 
institutionalisation of macro institutional policy, such as competitive tendering, within an 
organisation and managerial accountability among institutional actors. Managerial 
accountability shows how persons who have been delegated authority and responsibility 
to perform certain duties give accounts of reasons for actions or conduct to their hierarchy 
(Ahrens, 1996; Ezzamel et al., 2007; Roberts and Scapens, 1985). To increase the focus of 
this study, managerial accountability is limited to the use of public funds to outsource 
services of good quality at lower costs. Fourth, the theory of negotiated order (Strauss, 
1978) is extended to the framework of circuits of power (Clegg, 1989) to analyse how 
management accounting information that is institutionalised within an organisation 
becomes a tool of power that can be used to negotiate contractual relations with other 
organisations. Each theoretical approach is explained further, below. 
 
  
• Critical realism 
 
Critical realism is a philosophy and critical social theory that focuses on analysing the 
nature of reality in context (Bhaskar, 1975; 2011). The ontology of critical realism argues 
that the world, social and natural, has three stratification levels of reality: the real, the 
actual and the empirical, and exists independently of our knowledge of it. The empirical 
is the domain of experience; the actual is the domain of experience and events; and the 
real is the domain of mechanisms, events and experience (Bhaskar, 1975; Sayer, 2000). 
Critical realism differs from other critical theories on ontological grounds. For example, 
OIE focuses on one aspect of the world, the social, and on one domain of reality, the 
empirical. Critical realism, however, is compatible with institutional theory (Fleetwood, 
2004; Sayer, 2000). The compatibility of critical realism with other theories depends on 
whether the research focus is on substantive causes of a given phenomenon or on the 
nature and mechanisms underlying such a phenomenon. Critical realism provides 
conceptual tools to analyse the nature and mechanisms that underlie an institutional 
change process (Fleetwood, 2005; Reed, 2005; Sayer, 1992). Recent studies recommend 
applying critical realism in organisations and accounting change research (Al-Amoudi 
and Willmott, 2011; Modell, 2009; Newton et al., 2011). 
 
The world in critical realism is constituted by objects and structures, which have 
particular powers or strengths and liabilities or weaknesses to produce events.  
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An object is anything and anyone that can be a subject for a study. Powers and liabilities 
of an object refer to what the object can do and what it can suffer. The relationship among 
objects can be internal or external. An internal relationship exists when the relationship is 
necessary for the existence of the objects involved. For example, there is an internal 
relationship between a landlord and tenant because reference to a tenant implies the 
necessary existence of a landlord (Sayer, 2000). An external relationship is not necessary 
for the existence of the objects that form it. For example, the relationship between a 
hospital executive committee and a physician working in that hospital is external.  
 
Internally related objects form a structure. A structure has its own powers and liabilities 
capable of leading to different events independently. A mechanism is the particular way 
of doing by objects and their structures. Critical realism argues that the ways causal 
powers and liabilities of objects and their structures lead to an event depend on the 
activation of a necessary condition. A condition refers to an external mechanism that is 
necessary for the occurrence of an event (Bhaskar, 1975; Sayer, 1992). For example, a gun 
that is loaded with ammunition is ready to be shot. The gun cannot shoot, however, 
without someone pulling the trigger. In this example, pulling the trigger is a necessary 
condition for the gun to fire. Firing is an event that takes place in the actual domain of 
reality. Mechanisms that make a gun ready for shooting are in the real domain of reality. 
Therefore, the occurrence of an event in the actual domain of reality does not depend on 
the institutionalisation of mechanisms leading to that event from the real domain of 
reality but on the activation of a condition that is necessary for the event to occur 
(Bhaskar, 2011). An event can be experienced differently by different actors in the 
empirical domain of reality; this can cause other, different events or lead to different 
effects (Sayer, 1992; 2000).  
 
This study uses critical realism to extend the Burns and Scapens (2000) framework by 
analysing the relationship between the institutionalisation of management accounting and  
governance policies and accountability. Research question one is: 
 
How does institutionalisation of governance and budgetary policies affect the 
accountability of organisational actors when analysed from the perspective of critical 
realism? 
 
The theoretical contribution is to show to what extent the institutionalised change in the 
Burns and Scapens (2000) framework can be taken for granted to shape the ways 
institutional actors think and act in accountability relationships when the intra-
institutional change has taken place in a complex setting of governance policies.  
 
  
• Communicative action 
 
The theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1984; 1987) is a critical social theory that 
analyses how a society and its institutions use the steering media of money and power to 
colonise or alternatively to satisfy the needs of its organisations and their members. 
Broadbent et al. (1991) and Laughlin (1987) have extended the theory of communication 
action to accounting research by analysing how management uses accounting information 
and management accounting systems to shape thoughts and actions of organisational 
stakeholders at different levels of hierarchy (Broadbent et al., 2010; Broadbent et al., 2008; 
Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013). 
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Habermas (1984) defines communication as a process of interaction between two or more 
persons or organisations with freedom to express their thoughts and capacity to 
understand and explain their actions. The theory uses the concept of communication action 
to describe a rationality that organisational members use to reach mutual understanding 
through undistorted dialogue. Strategic action, on the other hand, relies on communicative 
process in which the speaker has pre-defined goals to achieve success (Habermas, 1984). 
The goal of communicative action is to reach mutual undertanding (Habermas, 1984). 
Reaching mutual understanding can be difficult, however, when communicating actors 
have divergent aims to acheive success (Roberts, 2001; 2009). As a consequence, a balance 
between self-motivated need to achieve success and a communicative action aimed at 
reaching mutual understanding shows the extent to which institutional actors can find a 
common ground to institutionalise a change (Broadbent et al., 2010; Lehman, 2006). 
 
The theory can be used compatibly with the Burns and Scapens (2000) framework because 
both conceptualise institutional change as a continuous process of interaction among 
actors in their organisational settings. A gap in the Burns and Scapens (2000) framework 
is the way  communication among institutional actors affects institutionalisation of 
management accounting rules and routines. The theory of communicative action provides 
a conceptual framework to fill this gap by analysing how institutional tools, processes and 
mechanisms of communication (Ross and Chiasson, 2011), such as management 
accounting and control systems, shape the ways institutional actors think and act in their 
fields (Broadbent et al., 2010); and how institutional actors interact with each other in 
accountability during the continuous process of institutional change (Broadbent et al., 
2001; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013; Roberts, 2009).  
 
This thesis uses the theory of communicative action to extend the Burns and Scapens 
(2000) framework to accountability by analysing the relationship between budgetary 
delegation, communicative action and accountability among budgetary actors. Research 
question two is: 
 
How budgetary delegation institutionalises accountability among budgetary actors 
when analysed through the lens of the theory of communicative action? 
 
The contributions of the thesis are to show the relevance of communicative rationalities as 
a mechanism of accountability and their effects on the assumption that institutionalised 
change shapes the ways of thinking and doing of institutional actors when institutional 
change has taken place (Burns and Scapens, 2000). 
 
• Circuits of power 
 
The framework of circuits of power (Clegg, 1989 p.187-210) analyses how power and 
resistance go together to shape the actions of organisational actors. Power is based on 
capacity to allocate and control resources, meanings and membership (Hardy, 1996). 
Resources can be financial and non-financial (Collier, 2001). Meanings that are allocated 
by the use of power can be legal or illegal, moral or immoral, objective or subjective 
(Nahapiet, 1988).  
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Allocating membership confers legitimacy to persons and organisations that receive the 
membership and obligation of loyalty towards the issuer of the membership (Burns, 2000; 
Liguori and Steccolini, 2011; Yazdifar et al., 2008). Power is not like a one way traffic 
(Foucault, 1991), however, because power and resistance form many circuits (Clegg, 
1989). A circuit of power is a structure of power that is inter-related among its holders and 
forms a mechanism to influence other persons or organisations (Clegg, 1989). 
 
Clegg, the founder of the framework of circuits of power, argues that circuits of power are 
threefold: episodic, facilitative and dispositional. The power to influence the action or 
conduct of another person or organisation in day-to-day interactions is episodic (Silva and 
Backhouse, 2003). For example, team leaders when giving orders to team members use 
their episodic circuits of power. The power to use discretion about how to apply the rules 
of the game in practice is known as facilitative circuits of power. For example, the power 
of medical professionals to use discretion in deciding how to treat their patients is 
facilitative. The power to use technics of production and innovation to influence 
organisational decision making is also facilitative (Backhouse et al., 2006; Ribeiro and 
Scapens, 2006). The power to use dominance in the giving of reward or punishment is 
dispositional (Foucault, 1991; Smith et al., 2010). For example, political decision makers 
use their dispositional circuits of power to set budgetary policies for their cities or 
countries (Lapsley et al., 2011). Episodic, dispositional and facilitative circuits of power 
interact in an obligatory passage point, that is, a point at which one circuit of power 
prevails over another (Clegg, 1989). Resistance to change arising from relationships 
between the circuits of power in obligatory passage points leads to what Clegg (1989) 
refers to as organisational outflanking. Organisational outflanking shows how holders of 
dominant circuits of power act strategically (Carter et al., 2010) in controlling and 
influencing actions of other organisations and their members in order to satisfy their own 
interests (Johnston, 2004; Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006). 
 
The framework of circuits of power provides conceptual tools with which to analyse the 
role of power in the institutionalisation of management accounting and control systems 
such as budgets. For example, Lapsley et al. (2011) used the framework of circuits of 
power at the macro institutional level to analyse the adoption of budgetary policies in 
minority governments of Scotland. They showed that successful negotiation of budgetary 
policies among political parties (i.e., dispositional circuits of power) depends on how the 
minority government enrols opposition parties into the coalition. Enrolment constitutes a 
facilitative circuit of power in negotiating budgetary policies. Lapsley et al. (2011) called 
for further research to analyse the role of episodic circuits of power in the 
institutionalisation of management accounting policies.   
 
At the micro institutional level, Ribeiro and Scapens (2006) used the framework of circuits 
of power to extend the Burns and Scapens (2000) framework by analysing how innovation 
becomes institutionalised within an organisation. Their research shows that institutional 
actors with high levels of technical knowledge (i.e., facilitative circuits of power) can resist 
the institutionalisation of intra-institutional policy change (i.e., dispositional circuits of 
power) that is undermining established routines in the field (i.e., episodic circuits of 
power). However, how the circuits of power affect the accountability of institutional 
actors in the institutionalisation of management accounting change and competitive 
tendering at organisational level is yet to be explored in critical accounting research.  
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For example, in the early 2000s the Commission of the European Union (EU) issued a 
directive to member countries to institutionalise competitive tendering during 
procurement of public goods and services (Mossialos et al., 2010). The institutionalisation 
of competitive tendering at national and local levels has led to controversial outcomes 
(Argento et al., 2010; Arlbjørn and Freytag, 2012). This raises the question as to how 
circuits of power among public sector decision makers, that is, public officials and 
political decision makers, and business organisations involved in the institutionalisation 
of competitive tendering affect managerial accountability among political decision makers 
and public officials.  
 
This thesis aims to fill this gap and extends the framework of circuits of power to the 
Burns and Scapens (2000) institutional framework by asking research question three:  
 
How circuits of power between private sector organisations and public sector 
decision makers affect institutionalisation of competitive tendering in public sector 
organisation and managerial accountability among public sector decision makers? 
 
A theoretical contribution is to show the roles of circuits of power during the 
institutionalisation of macro institutional policies, such as competitive tendering, and 
their impact on managerial accountability among public sector decision makers at a local 
organisational level. 
 
 
• Negotiated order 
 
The theory of negotiated order analyses institutional change (also called social order) as 
an outcome of negotiation (Strauss, 1978). Negotiation can be inter-personal or inter-
organisational. Inter-personal negotiation occurs among persons in an organisation. Inter-
organisational negotiation takes place among organisations (Maines, 1982).  
 
Negotiated order is not a random process but a systematic process of interaction among 
negotiating parties leading to an agreed upon way of acting (Strauss, 1978). As a 
consequence, change of a negotiated order can lead to an institutional change (Strauss, 
1982). Similar to OIE and NIS, the theory of negotiated order recognises that interactions 
among institutional actors have an impact on how new institutional policies become 
institutionalised (Basu et al., 1999). Institutional theories do not provide conceptual tools, 
however, to analyse the relationship between institutional rules and routines and the 
process of negotiating order through which the institutional rules and routines become 
institutions (Modell, 2006). Understanding the process and context of reaching a 
negotiated order gives conceptual tools to explain successful institutionalisation of 
management accounting policies (Pedersen and Mahad, 2011) and their impacts on the 
ways that institutional actors think and act in their fields (Basu et al., 1999; Parhankangas 
et al., 2005; Rahaman and Lawrence, 2001).  
 
For example, Modell (2006) used the theory of negotiated order and NIS to analyse the 
process of institutionalisation of new cost allocation policies in Swedish universities. The 
study showed that the power and politics of institutions and their actors shape the context 
and process of negotiating a new institutional order. Failure to overcome challenges of 
negotiating a new order affected the ways cost allocation policies became 
institutionalised.  
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A negotiated order leads to institutional stability and continuity at inter-organisational 
level (Parhankangas et al., 2005). Reaching a negotiated order, however, depends on 
relationships between circuits of power held by institutional actors (Lapsley et al., 2011). 
There is a gap in the literature relating to how management accounting rules and routines 
which are institutionalised within an organisation (Burns and Scapens, 2000) shape the 
process of negotiating order with other organisations when institutional actors have 
competing circuits of power. This thesis aims to fill this gap by asking research question 
four: 
How does institutionalised accounting information affect taken for granted ways of 
thinking and acting of institutional actors in negotiating inter-organisational order 
when analysed from the framework of circuits of power? 
 
A theoretical contribution is to show the nature of an institutionalised management 
accounting policy change (Burns and Scapens, 2000) and its role as a circuit of power in 
negotiating order between organisations.  
 
Table 1 provides a summary of the research questions. 
 
Table 1. Research questions 
 
Research question 1:  
 
How does institutionalisation of governance and budgetary 
policies affect the accountability of organisational actors 
when analysed from the perspective of critical realism? 
 
Research question 2:  
 
How budgetary delegation institutionalises accountability 
among budgetary actors when analysed through the lens of 
the theory of communicative action? 
 
 
Research question 3: 
 
How circuits of power between private sector organisations 
and public sector decision makers affect institutionalisation 
of competitive tendering in public sector organisation and 
managerial accountability among public sector decision 
makers? 
 
 
Research question 4:  
 
How does institutionalised accounting information affect 
taken for granted ways of thinking and acting of 
institutional actors in negotiating inter-organisational order 
when analysed from the framework of circuits of power? 
 
 
Each research question is addressed in an essay. Essay 1 has been accepted for publication 
in Critical Perspectives on Accounting (2013, Vol. 24, No. 7-8, pp. 518-531). Essay 2 is a work 
in progress and has been accepted for presentation and publication in many international 
accounting conferences. Essay 3 is in the process of publication in Qualitative Research in 
Accounting and Management. Essay 4 has been accepted for publication in Financial 
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10 
For example, in the early 2000s the Commission of the European Union (EU) issued a 
directive to member countries to institutionalise competitive tendering during 
procurement of public goods and services (Mossialos et al., 2010). The institutionalisation 
of competitive tendering at national and local levels has led to controversial outcomes 
(Argento et al., 2010; Arlbjørn and Freytag, 2012). This raises the question as to how 
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• Negotiated order 
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process of institutionalisation of new cost allocation policies in Swedish universities. The 
study showed that the power and politics of institutions and their actors shape the context 
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negotiating a new order affected the ways cost allocation policies became 
institutionalised.  
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A negotiated order leads to institutional stability and continuity at inter-organisational 
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3. Institutional Change Context  
 
 
Because of major institutional changes that occurred beginning in the 1990s, public sector 
organisations in Finland are an appropriate setting to collect data for the studies in this 
thesis. As discussed in more detail in the essays, the main institutional changes that 
occurred during the period studied can be summarised as: 1) financial, managerial and 
accounting change in hospital districts and municipalities; and 2) the institutionalisation 
of competitive tendering during procurement of public goods and services in public 
sector organisations.  
 
 
3.1. Institutional changes in hospital districts and municipalities 
 
Macro institutional changes in hospital districts can be subdivided into four groups: 
change of financing structure (Häkkinen and Lehto, 2005), introduction of accrual 
accounting principles and amendment of municipal law (Kurunmäki, 1999a), 
institutionalisation of management-by-result (Hyvönen and Järvinen, 2006; Kurunmäki, 
1999b), and empowerment of medical professionals in management accounting for their 
clinics (Jacobs, 2005; Kurunmäki, 2004).  
 
Traditionally, healthcare in Finland has been provided substantially by the public sector 
and financed by public funds. There are 20 hospital districts, which include five 
university medical school hospitals. Each hospital district is owned by a federation of 
surrounding municipalities and provides speciality healthcare services (Speciality Health 
Care Act, 1989). Healthcare centres provide primary care. Until the end of 1992, the 
central government had a centralised planning system through which it steered and 
controlled the development of healthcare services and their delivery. The centralised 
planning system used a rolling five-year national plan binding upon municipalities, 
public hospitals and healthcare centres; a centralised subsidy system was tied to the state 
budget (Häkkinen and Lehto, 2005). The aim was to ensure regional equality in the 
distribution of public health-related resources. State subsidies were allocated directly to 
public hospitals and financed substantial hospital investments approved by the central 
government and an average of around 40% of recurring costs such as material and 
personnel costs (Kurunmäki, 1999b; Linnakko and Back, 1994).  
 
In the 1980s, however, criticism from municipalities of this financing structure began to 
surface. Not only could central government officials refuse to finance investment plans of 
municipalities but they could also suspend financing of investment projects that had been 
approved previously if a municipality did not comply strictly with national guidelines 
(Häkkinen and Lehto, 2005). Moreover, although the five-year national plan was based on 
national policy, municipalities continued to finance the remaining part of public hospital 
costs over which they had no effective control. Public hospitals had incentives to continue 
planning new investments and to increase their costs as a way of attracting more state 
subsidies instead of striving for effectiveness and efficiency (Kurunmäki, 1999b; Linnakko 
and Back, 1994).  
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There was increasing criticism about the financial accountability of healthcare 
professionals as key decision makers in using public healthcare resources (Lapsley, 2001; 
Nyland and Pettersen, 2004; Pettersen, 2001) and the centralised financing system was 
accused of being wasteful (Kurunmäki, 1999b; Linnakko and Back, 1994).  
 
In response to these criticisms, in 1993, a revised State Subsidy Act (1992) came into force. 
The 1992 Act abolished allocation of state subsidies to public hospitals, and replaced it 
with a system that allocates all state subsidies to municipalities on a per-capita basis with 
adjustments based on the incidence of diseases per municipality (Linnakko and Back, 
1994). Hospital districts are now financed by their owner municipalities except when they 
sell services to other municipalities (Hyvönen and Järvinen, 2006). The 1992 Act 
transferred financial control of public hospital expenditure and investments from the 
central government to municipalities (Häkkinen and Lehto, 2005). Moreover, 
municipalities became free to purchase speciality healthcare services from any provider of 
their choice (Häkkinen and Lehto, 2005; Hyvönen and Järvinen, 2006; Linnakko and Back, 
1994).  
 
A revised Municipal Act in 1995 contained provisions regarding budgeting, accounting, 
financial management and auditing of municipalities effective from 1 January 1997 
(Section 101 of the Municipal Act, 1995). In 1995, municipal accounting was based on cash 
accounting principles (Näsi, 1999). With the revised Accounting Act (1997), accrual 
accounting principles were required (Vinnari and Näsi, 2008). The municipality section of 
the national accounting board in Finland provides further specific accounting regulations 
applicable to municipalities and municipal organisations (Vinnari and Näsi, 2008). The 
1995 Act requires municipal budgets to be in balance and emphasises the autonomy of 
municipalities in setting priorities to provide social, educational and recreational services 
to the population (Häkkinen and Lehto, 2005). Hospital districts are obligated to comply 
with the Municipal Act (1995) and the revised Accounting Act (1997). These legal reforms 
made hospital districts independent accounting entities that have a legal obligation to 
apply national accounting standards in making their budgets and financial reports 
(Kurunmäki, 1999a).   
 
The ability of municipalities to purchase speciality healthcare services from any provider 
of their choice introduced competition among hospital districts (Kurunmäki, 1999b). This 
led to the institutionalisation of a managed care system in which hospital districts act as 
sellers of speciality healthcare services to municipalities (Hyvönen and Järvinen, 2006). In 
practice, however, municipalities that are members of a hospital district use budgetary 
policies to set limits on the annual budgets of that hospital district so that planned costs of 
that hospital district are not larger than the municipalities’ own budgeted costs for 
speciality healthcare (Hyvönen and Järvinen, 2006). A leading municipal politician 
confirmed this: 
Our municipality owns more than 50% of this hospital district … Its budget 
proposal is discussed in the executive board of the hospital district which sees to it 
that it is within budget limits that can be acceptable in our municipal executive 
board … Otherwise, it has to be revised.6 
 
In order to adapt to major institutional changes, management control systems of hospital 
districts had to be reviewed and updated (Järvinen, 2006; Lehtonen, 2007).  
                                                
6 The author translated all quotes not in English 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
3. Institutional Change Context  
 
 
Because of major institutional changes that occurred beginning in the 1990s, public sector 
organisations in Finland are an appropriate setting to collect data for the studies in this 
thesis. As discussed in more detail in the essays, the main institutional changes that 
occurred during the period studied can be summarised as: 1) financial, managerial and 
accounting change in hospital districts and municipalities; and 2) the institutionalisation 
of competitive tendering during procurement of public goods and services in public 
sector organisations.  
 
 
3.1. Institutional changes in hospital districts and municipalities 
 
Macro institutional changes in hospital districts can be subdivided into four groups: 
change of financing structure (Häkkinen and Lehto, 2005), introduction of accrual 
accounting principles and amendment of municipal law (Kurunmäki, 1999a), 
institutionalisation of management-by-result (Hyvönen and Järvinen, 2006; Kurunmäki, 
1999b), and empowerment of medical professionals in management accounting for their 
clinics (Jacobs, 2005; Kurunmäki, 2004).  
 
Traditionally, healthcare in Finland has been provided substantially by the public sector 
and financed by public funds. There are 20 hospital districts, which include five 
university medical school hospitals. Each hospital district is owned by a federation of 
surrounding municipalities and provides speciality healthcare services (Speciality Health 
Care Act, 1989). Healthcare centres provide primary care. Until the end of 1992, the 
central government had a centralised planning system through which it steered and 
controlled the development of healthcare services and their delivery. The centralised 
planning system used a rolling five-year national plan binding upon municipalities, 
public hospitals and healthcare centres; a centralised subsidy system was tied to the state 
budget (Häkkinen and Lehto, 2005). The aim was to ensure regional equality in the 
distribution of public health-related resources. State subsidies were allocated directly to 
public hospitals and financed substantial hospital investments approved by the central 
government and an average of around 40% of recurring costs such as material and 
personnel costs (Kurunmäki, 1999b; Linnakko and Back, 1994).  
 
In the 1980s, however, criticism from municipalities of this financing structure began to 
surface. Not only could central government officials refuse to finance investment plans of 
municipalities but they could also suspend financing of investment projects that had been 
approved previously if a municipality did not comply strictly with national guidelines 
(Häkkinen and Lehto, 2005). Moreover, although the five-year national plan was based on 
national policy, municipalities continued to finance the remaining part of public hospital 
costs over which they had no effective control. Public hospitals had incentives to continue 
planning new investments and to increase their costs as a way of attracting more state 
subsidies instead of striving for effectiveness and efficiency (Kurunmäki, 1999b; Linnakko 
and Back, 1994).  
 
 
13 
There was increasing criticism about the financial accountability of healthcare 
professionals as key decision makers in using public healthcare resources (Lapsley, 2001; 
Nyland and Pettersen, 2004; Pettersen, 2001) and the centralised financing system was 
accused of being wasteful (Kurunmäki, 1999b; Linnakko and Back, 1994).  
 
In response to these criticisms, in 1993, a revised State Subsidy Act (1992) came into force. 
The 1992 Act abolished allocation of state subsidies to public hospitals, and replaced it 
with a system that allocates all state subsidies to municipalities on a per-capita basis with 
adjustments based on the incidence of diseases per municipality (Linnakko and Back, 
1994). Hospital districts are now financed by their owner municipalities except when they 
sell services to other municipalities (Hyvönen and Järvinen, 2006). The 1992 Act 
transferred financial control of public hospital expenditure and investments from the 
central government to municipalities (Häkkinen and Lehto, 2005). Moreover, 
municipalities became free to purchase speciality healthcare services from any provider of 
their choice (Häkkinen and Lehto, 2005; Hyvönen and Järvinen, 2006; Linnakko and Back, 
1994).  
 
A revised Municipal Act in 1995 contained provisions regarding budgeting, accounting, 
financial management and auditing of municipalities effective from 1 January 1997 
(Section 101 of the Municipal Act, 1995). In 1995, municipal accounting was based on cash 
accounting principles (Näsi, 1999). With the revised Accounting Act (1997), accrual 
accounting principles were required (Vinnari and Näsi, 2008). The municipality section of 
the national accounting board in Finland provides further specific accounting regulations 
applicable to municipalities and municipal organisations (Vinnari and Näsi, 2008). The 
1995 Act requires municipal budgets to be in balance and emphasises the autonomy of 
municipalities in setting priorities to provide social, educational and recreational services 
to the population (Häkkinen and Lehto, 2005). Hospital districts are obligated to comply 
with the Municipal Act (1995) and the revised Accounting Act (1997). These legal reforms 
made hospital districts independent accounting entities that have a legal obligation to 
apply national accounting standards in making their budgets and financial reports 
(Kurunmäki, 1999a).   
 
The ability of municipalities to purchase speciality healthcare services from any provider 
of their choice introduced competition among hospital districts (Kurunmäki, 1999b). This 
led to the institutionalisation of a managed care system in which hospital districts act as 
sellers of speciality healthcare services to municipalities (Hyvönen and Järvinen, 2006). In 
practice, however, municipalities that are members of a hospital district use budgetary 
policies to set limits on the annual budgets of that hospital district so that planned costs of 
that hospital district are not larger than the municipalities’ own budgeted costs for 
speciality healthcare (Hyvönen and Järvinen, 2006). A leading municipal politician 
confirmed this: 
Our municipality owns more than 50% of this hospital district … Its budget 
proposal is discussed in the executive board of the hospital district which sees to it 
that it is within budget limits that can be acceptable in our municipal executive 
board … Otherwise, it has to be revised.6 
 
In order to adapt to major institutional changes, management control systems of hospital 
districts had to be reviewed and updated (Järvinen, 2006; Lehtonen, 2007).  
                                                
6 The author translated all quotes not in English 
 
 
14 
Moreover, a management-by-result system, which was aimed at increasing the 
accountability of medical professionals in managing clinics became institutionalised 
(Kurunmäki, 1999b). One finance director of a hospital district confirmed: 
 
Management by result was introduced in the mid-1990s so that physicians could 
have active managerial roles in their clinics and accountability for results … the aim 
was that hospital districts be competitive from within and be able to compete with 
other hospital districts ...   
 
As a consequence, medical professionals voluntarily received additional training allowing 
them to have managerial roles and accountability, including price setting and budgetary 
management, in their clinics (Jacobs, 2005; Kurunmäki, 2004). A head physician from a 
clinical group of internal medicine in a hospital district summarised these institutional 
changes: 
In the late 1980s, when I graduated from my physician training, it was an insult to 
ask a physician any question related to hospital budgets or costs. That was not an 
issue for us to care about … Gradually, however, hospital districts started to 
organise voluntary training programs for physicians in which they learned how to 
calculate costs, set prices, plan and interpret a budget … I attended those courses … 
Currently, I can handle business issues related to our clinical group with ease … and 
I want to do it. 
 
Institutional changes in governing and financing public health care in Finland have had 
an impact on the ways in which municipalities use public funds to provide health care 
services to their population (Tynkkynen et al., 2012). In this setting, institutionalisation of 
competitive tendering in the procurement of public health care services in municipalities 
is an on-going issue.  
 
 
3.2. Competitive tendering of public elderly care services 
 
Every municipality in Finland has an obligation to provide care services to elderly 
persons, financed by public funds including municipal tax revenues. Municipal 
authorities, however, have the right to decide how to provide care to the elderly. For 
example, a municipality can use its own institutions, purchase elderly care services from 
private providers or both (Tynkkynen et al., 2012).  
 
In 2007, national legislation on competitive tendering in public procurement of goods and 
services was passed in Finland (the Public Procurement Act, 2007), which enforces the EU 
directive on public procurement of goods and services (Directive 2004/18/EC). Like the 
2007 Act, the 2004 EU directive addresses public procurement broadly but does not 
include practical specifications about how to implement competitive tendering processes 
in specific areas such as public health care (Mossialos et al., 2010). Implementation of the 
2007 Act led to official calls of competitive tenders for public elderly care services in 
municipalities. A manager of public elderly care stated: 
When the social security board of the city decided to organise competitive tendering 
of elderly care services, it was my responsibility to design a call for competitive 
tenders and to publish it nationally and internationally … I am an expert in public 
management of social services … I had, however, no previous experience of doing 
this… 
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Inviting international business organisations into the local aged care market introduced 
new circuits of power into municipalities, changed inter-organisational relationships 
between municipal authorities and local providers of elderly care services and launched a 
new negotiated order. The director of social and health care services in a municipality 
remarked:  
… According to the new public procurement law, it was compulsory for us to 
organise competitive tendering of elderly care services that the city needed to 
purchase from private organisations … In a way, we have now realised that 
competitive tendering of public aged care services is not the most appropriate 
strategy … It can even lead to a monopoly in the long-run. 
 
The process of institutionalisation of new policies in hospital districts and municipalities 
involves many actors and can be influenced by macro institutional forces at national and 
supra-national levels.  
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4. Methodology and Context Data 
 
 
The studies in this thesis used field study methodology and methods that are described in 
the following subsections.  
 
 
4.1. Methodology and methods 
 
In field research, the term methodology refers to the approach that is used to conduct 
research, for example: qualitative and quantitative methodologies. The term method refers 
to research technics that are used to collect and interpret data, for example, interview, 
document analysis or observation. The concept of field refers to a place from which data 
are collected (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006). The concept of study refers to the research 
project (Dul and Hak, 2008; Yin, 2008).  
 
Quantitative and qualitative methodologies have ontological and epistemological 
differences. For example, quantitative research has a positivistic ontology that assumes 
that there is an objective empirical reality that is external to the subject of the study 
(Bhaskar, 2011). Quantitative methods use archives, surveys and experiments to collect 
data and apply statistics to analyse the data (Dul and Hak, 2008). Quantitative research 
puts more emphasis on method than methodology and aims to reach findings that can be 
generalised to analysed larger population (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006).  
 
Qualitative ontology assumes social reality is emergent, subjective and constructed 
(Bhaskar, 2011). As a consequence, the meaning of the data depends on theoretical 
explanation that connects the data to the research questions and findings (Sayer, 2000). 
Qualitative data can be based on document analysis, interviews, participation in meetings 
and observation (Baxter and Chua, 1998; 2008). Field studies can use either qualitative or 
quantitative methods or combine them (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006). Interpretation of the 
data, however, needs to apply features of qualitative methodology (Dul and Hak, 2008).   
 
The studies in this thesis use qualitative methods and methodology because they provide 
tools to collect data that show how institutional actors interact with one another during 
the institutionalisation of governance and budgetary policies, competitive tendering and 
accountability.  
 
Layder (1993) suggested a four-step approach to designing and conducting qualitative 
field research that is intended to contribute to theory: the self, situated activity, setting 
and context. The self is any actor or organisation for which action is self-motivated. 
Because of unlimited aspects of the self, he recommended focus on specific aspects of 
actors or organisations (Layder, 1993). Analysing the self requires examination of how an 
actor influences action or the conduct of other actors in a situated activity, that is, any 
action of the self done in social relations with other selves aiming to influence their ways 
of thinking or doing (Layder, 1993).  
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In this setting, social relations become a field of interaction among the selves (Broadbent 
and Laughlin, 1997) in which a negotiated order becomes achieved (Strauss, 1978). The 
setting includes organisational strengths and weaknesses and circumstances under which 
interactions among the selves take place. The context includes organisational constraints 
at micro institutional level and environmental pressure at macro institutional level 
(Layder, 1993). Layder (1993) did not prioritise which steps take precedence over others. 
 
Sayer (1992) recommends an intensive research methodology in conducting a critical field 
study. One aspect is emphasis on active interaction between the researcher and field 
actors in order to understand mechanisms that lead to events or non-events in particular 
settings and contexts. When the aim of the study is not to generalise empirical findings, 
an intensive research methodology offers tools to collect data that corroborate how 
organisational actors think and act in interactions with other actors and how circuits of 
power among actors or organisations interact in obligatory passage points (Davenport 
and Leitch, 2005). Data collection should use multiple methods, such as interviews, 
document analysis and observation (Yin, 2008). Interview questions should seek to 
analyse how events occur under a particular setting and context and how actors react to 
those events (Sayer, 1992). Interpretation of the data should seek to understand the 
meaning that actors give to their actions (Danermark et al., 1997).  
 
In critical realism, mechanisms that lead to an event may not be apparent or visible in the 
empirical field. Therefore, the next step in analysing data is to apply retroduction, a 
thinking process that involves reconstruction of basic conditions under which things are 
or are not (Danermark et al., 1997). In retroduction, the focus is on why, how, when and 
where an event happens while another does not under similar conditions (Sayer, 2000).  
 
 
4.2. Field studies 
 
Following approaches of Layder (1993),  Sayer (1992) and Ahrens and Chapman (2006),  
field research was conducted from 2008 to 2013 in Finland in two hospital districts, 
referred to as Silta and Omega; a not-for-profit health care organisation, referred to as 
Credo; and a municipality, referred to as Sunset City.  
 
 
• Field studies in hospital districts 
 
The choice of Silta and Omega hospitals was made during a pilot study in 2009 that 
indicated Silta and Omega were appropriate fields to analyse relationships among the 
institutionalisation of governance and budgetary policies and accountability of 
institutional actors from a critical perspective. Access to the field and possibility to collect 
first hand information from key actors can also be mentioned among factors that 
motivated this choice. Silta and Omega have stable financial situations but face increasing 
competition from neighbouring hospital districts.  
 
Each hospital district has a council as the highest governing authority, an executive board 
and an executive committee. Elected politicians from municipalities compose the council 
and the executive board. The council meets twice a year to issue budgetary policies and to 
approve the annual financial reports of the hospital district.  
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In this setting, social relations become a field of interaction among the selves (Broadbent 
and Laughlin, 1997) in which a negotiated order becomes achieved (Strauss, 1978). The 
setting includes organisational strengths and weaknesses and circumstances under which 
interactions among the selves take place. The context includes organisational constraints 
at micro institutional level and environmental pressure at macro institutional level 
(Layder, 1993). Layder (1993) did not prioritise which steps take precedence over others. 
 
Sayer (1992) recommends an intensive research methodology in conducting a critical field 
study. One aspect is emphasis on active interaction between the researcher and field 
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settings and contexts. When the aim of the study is not to generalise empirical findings, 
an intensive research methodology offers tools to collect data that corroborate how 
organisational actors think and act in interactions with other actors and how circuits of 
power among actors or organisations interact in obligatory passage points (Davenport 
and Leitch, 2005). Data collection should use multiple methods, such as interviews, 
document analysis and observation (Yin, 2008). Interview questions should seek to 
analyse how events occur under a particular setting and context and how actors react to 
those events (Sayer, 1992). Interpretation of the data should seek to understand the 
meaning that actors give to their actions (Danermark et al., 1997).  
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where an event happens while another does not under similar conditions (Sayer, 2000).  
 
 
4.2. Field studies 
 
Following approaches of Layder (1993),  Sayer (1992) and Ahrens and Chapman (2006),  
field research was conducted from 2008 to 2013 in Finland in two hospital districts, 
referred to as Silta and Omega; a not-for-profit health care organisation, referred to as 
Credo; and a municipality, referred to as Sunset City.  
 
 
• Field studies in hospital districts 
 
The choice of Silta and Omega hospitals was made during a pilot study in 2009 that 
indicated Silta and Omega were appropriate fields to analyse relationships among the 
institutionalisation of governance and budgetary policies and accountability of 
institutional actors from a critical perspective. Access to the field and possibility to collect 
first hand information from key actors can also be mentioned among factors that 
motivated this choice. Silta and Omega have stable financial situations but face increasing 
competition from neighbouring hospital districts.  
 
Each hospital district has a council as the highest governing authority, an executive board 
and an executive committee. Elected politicians from municipalities compose the council 
and the executive board. The council meets twice a year to issue budgetary policies and to 
approve the annual financial reports of the hospital district.  
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The executive board monitors the execution of the council’s decisions and meets once a 
month. The hospital district’s director leads the executive committee, composed of 
leading medical professionals and the finance director of the hospital district, which is 
accountable to the council and the executive board. The executive committee is 
responsible for the operative activities of the hospital district. Silta and Omega hospitals 
are divided into four clinical groups based on medical specialities, and have a general 
administration department. The heads of clinical groups, surgery, internal medicine, 
psychiatry and medical support, which includes laboratory, pharmacy and logistics, are 
physicians assisted by head nurses. Clinical groups are divided into many clinics and 
clinical units. The number and size of clinical units depends on the specialities of each 
clinic. Managers of clinics and clinical units are senior physicians or senior nurses.  
 
Field studies started with analyses of archival data from hospital districts’ websites, 
newspapers, printed information, financial reports, and board and council meeting 
minutes. Analyses of archival data gave insights into the budgetary management of Silta 
and Omega but revealed little about accountability among budgetary actors.  
 
In the second step of the field studies, interviews were conducted with key decision 
makers in Silta and Omega, such as hospital directors and finance directors (Silta and 
Omega), heads of the surgery and medical support clinical groups (Silta hospital), chief 
planning officer (Silta hospital), chief internal auditor (Omega hospital), chairperson of 
the executive board (Omega hospital) and chief auditor (Omega hospital). Interviewees 
explained processes of institutionalisation of accountability for budgets allocated to 
clinical groups and the role of elected municipal representatives at hospital district level 
in this process.  
 
The third step included interviews with selected key individuals who influence municipal 
budgetary policies such as the chairperson of the audit board of the city in which Omega 
hospital is located, and the chief finance officer and financial manager of the city in which 
Silta hospital is located. To increase reliability, additional interviews were conducted in 
2010, 2011 and 2012 with the chief planning officer and internal auditors at university 
hospital A, the chief finance officer at University hospital B, the finance manager at a city 
hospital, and the chief planning officer at another hospital district.  
 
To analyse how medical professionals think and act when managing the budgets of their 
clinics and giving accounts for their actions to those above them in the hospital hierarchy, 
the study conducted interviews in 2012 with selected key medical professionals having 
managerial duties in the clinical groups of Silta and Omega hospitals. Data validity and 
reliability checks are explained in more detail in the essays.  
 
Interviews were based on semi-structured and open-ended questionnaires that the 
interviewee could obtain a few days prior to the interview upon request. Interviewees 
could answer interview questions in writing before the interview or orally during the 
interview. Interviewees had a good command of English but could express themselves in 
Finnish or Swedish depending on their choice. Interview summaries were in English and 
were discussed afterwards with the interviewees as one means to assess reliability of the 
data. 
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• Field studies in Sunset City and Credo 
 
The choice of Sunset City is based on a competitive tendering process for elderly care 
services in that city in the late 2000s. Also, direct access to field actors and the opportunity 
to obtain first hand information due to participation in meetings at various levels of the 
hierarchy in Sunset City and in Credo made them a good choice for the field study.  
 
While the total costs of social and health care services in Sunset City are between 40% and 
50% of the budget of the city, public elderly care costs are among the highest cost lines. A 
gradual increase in the aging population, rapidly growing costs of public elderly care and 
a decrease in tax revenues put pressure on the social authorities of Sunset City to look for 
alternative ways to provide elderly care services to the elderly. Therefore, the political and 
social policies of Sunset City in the mid-2000s were to purchase a considerable amount of 
public aged care services from private providers at a so-called market price.  
 
Credo did not win the tender competition because its offer was not the cheapest. Credo, 
however, used its circuits of power, including its institutionalised cost accounting 
information, and successfully negotiated an elderly care contract with Sunset City after 
the tender process. Therefore, Credo provides a good site for a field study that analyses 
critically the role of institutionalised accounting information in not-for-profit organisation 
negotiating care contracts with public authorities in the era of competitive tendering.  
 
Data collection based on document analysis, interviews and participation in meetings 
lasted from 2008 to 2013. Document analysis started by examining public procurement 
rules in Finland and the decision-making process of the social security board of Sunset 
City. The social security board is a political organisation composed of local politicians 
who are elected democratically in municipal elections for a four-year term. The role of the 
social security board is to make decisions regarding the social affairs of the city and to 
monitor their implementation. It reports to the executive board of the city or municipality, 
another political body composed of elected politicians. The highest leading political body, 
however, is the council. Members of the council are representatives of political parties 
who have won majority votes in municipal elections. Each municipality or city has an 
audit committee. The audit committee reports directly to the council; it is composed of 
local politicians elected in municipal elections and has the power to monitor all decisions 
made by other political bodies of the municipality and municipal officials (Municipal Act, 
1995).  
 
To obtain information about competitive tendering of elderly care services, the study 
conducted interviews with the following officials, all in Sunset City: the director of social 
and health care services, the finance manager of social services, the manager of aged care 
services, the chairperson of the social security board, two members of the social security 
board, a member of the audit committee and an internal auditor.  
 
To obtain information about the role of accounting information in the decision-making 
process of Credo and how Credo used its cost accounting information to negotiate the 
elderly care contract with Sunset City, interviews were conducted with following officials 
at Credo: the chairperson of the executive board, the chief executive officer and four 
members of the executive board of Credo.  
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To obtain information about the impact of public procurement law on the quality of 
elderly care services during competition, the study conducted interviews with a member 
of the Parliament of Finland, a legal expert in public procurement of elderly care, a 
regional inspector of elderly care services and two local entrepreneurs in elderly care.  
 
To assess similarities and differences between the institutionalisation of competitive 
tendering for elderly care service at a regional level, the study conducted interviews with 
the chief executive officer and head of the executive board of another not-for-profit 
organisation that has been involved in competition for elderly care services in another 
municipality (not reported in this study).  
 
To obtain information about how organisational actors think and act in negotiating order, 
that is, analysis of the self in situated activity and organisational setting, the field research 
included participation in various board and managerial meetings of Credo in which the 
role of accounting information was discussed and used in setting strategies to sell aged 
care services to Sunset City and other clients. Participation in four meetings of the social 
security board of Sunset City gave information about the process of public procurement 
of various health care services. Participation in meetings of the audit committee of Sunset 
City revealed how the circuits of power interact in public procurement during 
competitive tendering and thereafter, that is, analysis of the selves in social relations. 
Participation in board meetings of Credo gave information about how the leadership of 
Credo aligned its episodic and facilitative circuits of power into obligatory passage points 
controlled by the dispositional circuit of power of Sunset City. Participation in meetings 
lasted around 60 hours.  
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5. Summary of Findings and Concluding Remarks 
 
This section gives a brief overview of research findings and theoretical contribution of 
each essay separately. Concluding remarks, practical implications and recommendations 
for further research follow. 
 
 
5.1. Critical realism in the institutionalisation of governance and 
budgetary policies: what about accountability? 
 
 
Aim and research question  
 
This study aims at using critical realism to extend the institutional framework proposed 
by Burns and Scapens (2000). The research question is how institutionalisation of 
governance and budgetary policies affects the accountability of organisational actors 
when analysed from a critical realism perspective.  
 
 
Findings 
 
The research shows that institutionalisation of governance and budgetary policies 
resulted in two institutions of budgetary governance: the political and the technical. The 
political institution issues governance and budgetary policies to the technical institution, 
which in turn is accountable to the political institution. Each institution has its own 
strengths and weaknesses that make it work in a particular way during the 
institutionalisation of budgetary governance and accountability. For example, the political 
institution can set limits on the budget of the technical institution. The technical 
institution, however, can use its professional autonomy and discretion to overspend its 
budget when that is necessary in order to treat the patients thoroughly.  
 
The research shows that the political and technical institutions are in the real domain of 
reality. The relationship between governance and budgetary policies forms a mechanism 
whose activation affects the ways that budgetary actors in the technical institution 
discharge their accountability towards the political institution. Accountability takes place 
in the actual domain of reality. Accountability narratives, however, reflect the ways 
institutional actors think and act in their empirical domain of reality, that is, in the clinics. 
For example: the use of political and managerial power to set arbitrary limits on the 
budget of the technical institution in Omega hospital led to ceremonial accountability of 
budgetary actors in the technical institution. In contrast, active interactions among 
hospital executives and medical professionals who manage clinical groups in Silta 
hospital led to instrumental accountability of the heads of clinic groups.  
 
The research shows that budgetary actors had different patterns of thinking and doing at 
different organisational levels in Omega and Silta hospitals and different accountability 
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perspectives in the actual and empirical domains of reality. The differences are caused by 
the ways governance policies from the real domain of reality interact with budgetary 
actors’ ways of thinking and doing in the empirical and actual domains of reality.  
 
For example, the institutionalisation of governance for performance in the empirical 
domain of reality at Silta hospital has increased the instrumental accountability of medical 
professionals who manage clinics and clinical groups. In contrast, the institutionalisation 
of governance for mission, that is a governance policy aiming to reach the general mission 
of the hospital district to provide specialised health care services to the population, at 
Omega hospital has increased ceremonial accountability in the empirical and actual 
domain of reality of the technical institution at Omega.  
 
The framework by Burns and Scapens (2000) assumes the institutionalisation of 
management accounting rules and routines leads to taken for granted ways of thinking 
and acting of institutional actors when institutional change has taken place. The findings 
of this study show, however, that mere institutionalisation of management accounting 
rules, such as budgetary policies, does not per se lead to taken for granted ways in which 
institutional actors think and act in giving account for their conduct in the empirical and 
actual domains of reality when their accountability is shaped by mechanisms of the real 
domain of reality, such as political governance policies, over which they have no control 
or influence.  
 
The main contribution of this study is to extend the Burns and Scapens (2000) conceptual 
framework to critical realism by showing that the institutionalisation of intra-institutional 
budgetary policies in the real domain of reality does not always lead to taken for granted 
ways in which budgetary actors discharge their accountability in the actual and empirical 
domains of reality when influenced by controversial governance policies from the 
hierarchy.  
 
 
5.2. Budgetary delegation and communicative action in the 
institutionalisation of accountability 
 
 
Aim and research question  
 
This study analysed the relationship between budgetary delegation, communicative 
action and institutionalisation of accountability among budgetary actors. The aim of the 
study is to use the theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1984; 1987) to extend the 
institutional framework proposed by Burns and Scapens (2000) to accountability. The 
research question asks how budgetary delegation institutionalises accountability among 
budgetary actors when analysed through the lens of the theory of communicative action.  
 
 
Findings 
 
The research shows that budgetary delegation institutionalises different institutions of 
accountability, instrumental and ceremonial, among budgetary actors depending on 
management’s oversight of budgetary delegation and the reaction of medical 
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professionals to these processes. Instrumental accountability is the result of mutual 
understanding between management and budgetary actors in planning, negotiating and 
implementing delegated budgets and a willingness of budgetary actors to accept 
budgetary constraints on their organisational units. Effective management oversight and a 
possibility for budgetary actors to communicate openly about reasons for, and 
compromises about, the imposition of budgetary constraints are other explanatory factors 
that show how budgetary delegation institutionalises instrumental accountability among 
budgetary actors. For example, at Silta, the use of an integrated planning system that links 
clinical operational goals and budgetary plans, and a possibility for medical professionals 
to propose and influence budgets of their clinics has led to instrumental accountability of 
heads of clinical units and managers of clinics. The lack of such a communicative action 
approach in Omega explains the ceremonial accountability finding.  
 
The research assessed the ways of thinking and doing of budgetary actors by examining 
how heads of clinical groups make budgetary decisions in accountability relationships 
and how they use communication with clinical unit managers to make sense of their 
accountability to their patients and to executives. At Silta, informal communication 
between hospital executives and clinic managers supplements formal communication 
channels at different hierarchical levels, which increases understanding of how and why 
instrumental accountability in managing clinical budgets has been achieved. At Omega, 
however, the use of informal communication as an alternative way to understand what is 
going on in clinics cannot be taken for granted to increase budgetary accountability of 
clinic managers.  
 
Burns and Scapens (2000) argued that the institutionalisation of management accounting 
rules and routines leads to taken for granted ways of thinking and doing of institutional 
actors regardless of resistance to change encountered in the institutionalisation process. 
This study shows, however, that intra-institutional change is shaped by various 
rationalities that are used to communicate the institutional change and to monitor its 
outcome. At Silta and Omega hospitals, for example, each medical expertise has a 
different approach on how its budget should be shaped and monitored. As a result, 
budgetary delegation in clinical units cannot be taken for granted to institutionalise 
accountability among clinical unit managers in the same way as suggested in 
management accounting institutional change literature (Burns and Scapens, 2000; 
Scapens, 2006; Scapens and Varoutsa 2010). This study uses the theory of communication 
action (Habermas, 1984; Laughlin, 1987) to argue that accountability is more an issue of 
emancipation than colonisation.  
 
The contribution of this research is to use the theory of communicative action (Habermas, 
1984) to extend the institutional framework proposed by Burns and Scapens (2000) to 
accountability by showing the relevance of communicative rationalities through which 
budgetary delegation institutionalises accountability among budgetary actors and their 
effects on taken for granted assumptions underlying an institutionalised change. 
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The contribution of this research is to use the theory of communicative action (Habermas, 
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5.3. Circuits of power during the institutionalisation of competitive 
tendering and accountability 
 
 
Aim and research question  
 
This study uses the framework of circuits of power (Clegg, 1989) to extend the Burns and 
Scapens (2000) institutional framework to managerial accountability. The research 
question was how circuits of power between private sector organisations and public 
sector decision makers affect institutionalisation of competitive tendering in public sector 
organisation and managerial accountability among public sector decision makers.  
 
 
Findings 
 
The research shows that public officials at Sunset City had an episodic circuit of power 
based on their professional expertise in health care management and legitimacy to act as 
representatives of Sunset City during the institutionalisation of competitive tendering. 
The need to cut costs for public elderly care services and the obligation to institutionalise 
competitive tendering during procurement of public goods and services increased the 
episodic circuit of power of public officials in charge of elderly care. In principle, political 
decision makers could use their dispositional circuit of power to overturn the decisions of 
public officials. During the institutionalisation of competitive tendering, however, the 
episodic circuit of power of public officials prevailed over the dispositional circuit of 
power of political decision makers. The study argues that public officials and political 
decision makers failed to use appropriate management accounting and control tools 
among their episodic and dispositional circuits of power to design, implement and 
institutionalise competitive tendering that minimises procurement risks. As a result, a 
multinational business organisation used its strategic power based on technical and 
operational dominance as a facilitative circuit of power to win competitive tendering and 
to outflank an institutionalised relationship with Sunset City at the expense of higher 
costs for public services that the city must finance. Managerial accountability among 
public sector decision makers was ceremonial.  
 
For practical and policy implications, it is important to assign tasks to encode, enact and 
reproduce an institutionalisation process to persons that can use appropriate management 
accounting and control systems to minimise procurement risks. Instrumental use of 
management accounting and control systems can minimise procurement risks and 
improve managerial accountability among public sector decision makers. 
 
The primary theoretical contribution of this study is to extend the framework of circuits of 
power (Clegg, 1989) to the Burns and Scapens (2000) institutional framework in analysing 
inter-organisational institutionalisation process (Scapens and Varoutsa 2010) and intra-
organisational managerial accountability as outcome.  
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From a conceptual approach, this study adds the concept of organisational outflanking to 
the Burns and Scapens (2000) institutional framework to show how and why the 
institutionalisation of competitive tendering cannot be taken-for-granted to save costs of 
public services nor to improve managerial accountability among public sector decision 
makers.  
 
 
 
5.4. Accounting for competition, negotiated order and circuits of 
power during institutional change 
 
 
Aim and research question  
 
The aim of this study was to extend the Burns and Scapens (2000) framework to the 
theory of negotiated order and the framework of circuits of power by analysing the extent 
to which institutionalised accounting information becomes a circuit of power in 
negotiating inter-organisational order during competition. To increase the focus, this 
paper analyses the role of cost accounting information. The research question was how 
institutionalised accounting information affects the taken for granted ways of thinking 
and acting of institutional actors in negotiating inter-organisational order when analysed 
from the framework of circuits of power.  
 
 
Findings 
 
The research shows that institutionalised accounting information at Credo became an 
instrumental tool in designing and offering a contract of elderly care services to Sunset 
City, despite the risk of losing the contract because of competition. The instrumental 
finding is consistent with earlier institutional change studies discussed in the paper and 
shows the relevance of the Burns and Scapens (2000) framework as a starting point to 
analyse the outcome of intra-institutional change in negotiating order.  
 
The instrumental use of accounting information became an episodic circuit of power that 
the leadership of Credo used to challenge the ways of thinking and acting of Sunset City 
authorities during contractual negotiations. This episodic circuit of power, however, 
could not have been strong enough to negotiate order in favour of Credo without its 
facilitative circuits of power. The facilitative circuit of power that Credo used was based 
on its service quality and ethical ideology in taking care of the elderly. Credo used its 
episodic and facilitative circuit of power to argue that high quality elderly care comes at a 
cost, which political decision makers and public officials at Sunset City had to support as 
a matter of welfare principle. To reach a negotiated order, Credo supplemented its 
episodic and facilitative circuits of power with legal expertise in public procurement of 
elderly care services, which influenced the dispositional circuit of power of Sunset City 
authorities. Convincing political decision makers and public officials at Sunset City was 
an obligatory passage point for Credo. As a consequence, Sunset City agreed to continue 
contractual relationships with Credo.  
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This finding shows how episodic and facilitative circuits of power at micro institutional 
levels can be used to negotiate inter-organisational order at macro institutional level and 
the role of institutionalised accounting information in this setting. 
 
The study contributes to the literature by showing that institutionalised accounting 
change can be instrumental in shaping the ways that institutional actors think and act and 
can become an episodic circuit of power in an intra-institutional setting. Because inter-
organisational negotiated order does not take place in closed systems such as laboratories, 
however, the instrumental and episodic circuit of power arising from institutionalised 
accounting change cannot be taken for granted to prevail in obligatory passage points in 
which facilitative and dispositional circuits of power interact. Lapsley et al. (2011) 
analysed how facilitative and dispositional circuits of power interact in obligatory 
passage points in negotiating budgetary settings involving minority governments. 
Lapsley et al. (2011), however, did not analyse how episodic circuits of power interact 
with other circuits of power in obligatory passage points and called for further studies 
filling this gap. This study extends the findings of Lapsley et al. (2011) to the episodic 
circuit of power. Scapens and Varoutsa (2010) called for further studies applying the 
Burns and Scapens (2000) framework in institutional change that takes place in inter-
organisational settings. This study answers the call of Scapens and Varoutsa (2010) by 
adding negotiated order and circuits of power perspectives to the Burns and Scapens 
(2000) framework. 
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5.5. Summary of the main contributions of the four studies 
 
Table 2 summarises the main theoretical contributions of this thesis. 
 
Table 2. Theoretical contributions 
 
Essay 1: 
 
This study extends the Burns and Scapens (2000) framework to 
critical realism. The main theoretical contribution is to show how 
and why the institutionalisation of intra-institutional budgetary 
policies does not always lead to taken for granted ways in which 
budgetary actors discharge their accountability. Example: 
governance policies from the hierarchy affect the accountability of 
budgetary actors and the outcome of the institutional change 
process.  
 
Essay 2:  
 
This study uses the theory of communicative action (Habermas, 
1984; 1987) to extend the Burns and Scapens (2000) framework to 
accountability. The main theoretical contribution is to show the 
relevance of communicative rationalities underlying budgetary 
delegation during the institutionalisation of accountability among 
budgetary actors at different organisational levels. 
 
 
Essay 3:  
 
This study uses the framework of circuits of power (Clegg, 1989) to 
extend the Burns and Scapens (2000) institutional framework to 
managerial accountability. The main theoretical contribution is to 
show the role circuits of power in inter-organisational 
institutionalisation process (Scapens and Varoutsa 2010) and effects 
on intra-organisational managerial accountability as outcome. The 
study adds the concept of organisational outflanking to the Burns 
and Scapens (2000) framework to explain how and why 
institutionalisation of competitive tendering cannot be taken for 
granted to save costs in public sector organisation nor improve 
managerial accountability among public sector decision makers.  
 
 
Essay 4:  
 
This study extends the Burns and Scapens (2000) framework to the 
theory of negotiated order and the framework of circuits of power. 
The main theoretical contributions are to show how 
institutionalised accounting information can be instrumental in 
organisational decision making. The instrumental pattern of 
thinking and acting becomes an episodic circuit of power. The 
episodic circuit of power cannot be taken for granted to prevail 
over other circuits of power, however, in negotiating in inter-
organisational relationships. 
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5.6. Concluding remarks 
 
The findings of the studies in this thesis demostrate how institutionalisation of 
competitive tendering, goverance and budgetary policies cannot be taken for granted to 
improve to accountability among institutional actors. The studies in this thesis have used 
multiple theories to analyse the roles of communicative rationalities, negotiated order, 
critical realism and circuits of power during the institutionalisation process at 
organisational levels and among organisations.  
 
By using a critical realism approach, the studies in this thesis show that 
institutionalisation of budgetary policies cannot be taken for granted to lead to 
accountability in the actual and empirical domains of reality because accountability 
relationships are influenced by mechanisms of the real domain of reality, such as 
governance policies that are independent of the intra-institutional process of management 
accounting change. 
 
By using the theory of communicative action, the studies in this thesis show that 
budgetary delegation institutionalises different institutions of accountability, ceremonial 
and instrumental, among budgetary actors. The accountability outcome depends on 
communicative rationalities that management uses to reach mutual understanding with 
budgetary actors during the institutionalisation process and willingness of budgetary 
actors to accept responsibility and accountability to use their budgets as agreed upon with 
management. Monitoring accountability through informal discourses with budgetary 
actors, however, cannot be taken for granted to improve instrumental role of budgetary 
information in organisational decision making during budgetary implementation. The 
study argues that budgetary delegation does not institutionalise accountability among 
budgetary actors as described in the Burns and Scapens (2000) framework and other 
institutional change literature, because accountability is an issue of emancipation rather 
than colonisation (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013; Habermas, 2006; Lehman, 2006).  
 
The studies in this thesis used the framework of circuits of power to demonstrate how 
failure of public sector decision makers to use management accounting and control 
systems that minimise procurement risks among episodic and dispositional circuits of 
power of public sector organisation led to organisational outflanking and ceremonial 
accountability among public sector decision makers during institutionalisation of 
competitive tendering. The ways in which a multinational business sector organisation 
used its operational and technical dominance as a facilitative circuit of power to win the 
competitive tendering process in this setting, explain the organisational outflanking 
finding and its effect on managerial accountability relationships among public decision 
makers. The financial consequences on rapidly growing costs of public services 
outsourced from competitive winners, such as, multinational business sector 
organisations, are political topics in the media and at the government level in Finland. 
 
The studies in this thesis extend the Burns and Scapens (2000) institutional framework to 
the theory of negotiated order and the framework of circuits of power to demonstrate that 
management accounting information that is institutionalised within an organisation can 
become instrumental in organisational decision making. The instrumental way of 
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thinking and acting constitutes an episodic circuit of power organisations can use to 
negotiate contractual relationships with other organisations.  
To reach a favourable negotiated order, however, the organisation needs to activate its 
facilitative circuits of power based on ideology, ethics and networks. As a consequence, 
the instrumental use of an institutionalised accounting information within an organisation 
cannot be taken for granted to prevail in obligatory passage points during negotiation of 
inter-organisational order, unless supplemented by other institutional mechanisms.  
 
The cultural context and the setting of public sector organisations in which the empirical 
parts of the studies in this thesis have been conducted are specific to the Nordic countries’ 
ways of life. For example, low power distance, high uncertain avoidance and weak 
hierarchy7 in not-for-profit and public health care organisations in Finland are factors that 
limit generalisation of the empirical findings to organisations other than those analysed. 
The theoretical frameworks of the thesis can be applied validly in other studies.   
 
 
5.7. Practical implications and further research 
 
Essay 1 shows how governance policies affect ways in which the institutionalisation of 
management accounting change leads to accountability among institutional actors.  
A practical implication is that it is essential to institutionalise governance and 
management accounting policies that are not contradictory and that reflect the ways in 
which institutional actors think and act in their fields. A next step is to analyse in further 
research how and in what ways organisations can use organisational actors’ thinking as a 
key to success in designing and institutionalising new governance and management 
accounting policies.   
 
Essay 2 shows how the communicative rationalities underlying budgetary delegation 
affect the institutionalisation of accountability among budgetary actors. A practical 
implication is that reaching mutual understanding among budgetary actors in planning, 
negotiating and concluding budgets is a key that management can use to institutionalise 
instrumental budgetary accountability at different organisational levels. Further research 
could analyse how discourses of accountability affect management accounting practices 
and communication among budgetary actors in organisational decision making. To reach 
this goal, experimental research can give more insights than qualitative field research.8   
 
Essay 3 shows how extra-organisational facilitative circuits of power affect the 
institutionalisation of competitive tendering, organisational outflanking and managerial 
accountability among public decision makers. A practical implication is to avoid initiating 
an intra-institutional policy change for which outcomes in terms of costs and 
accountability can go beyond the control of the organisation where institutional change 
has taken place. An essential next step for further research is to analyse strategies through 
                                                
7 See for more details: Hassel, L. G. and G. M. Cunningham (2004), 'Psychic distance and budget control of 
foreign subsidiaries'. Journal of International Accounting Research, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 79-93. 
8 For further discussion and methodological guidance, see: Libby, R., R. Bloomfield and  M. W. Nelson (2002), 
'Experimental research in financial accounting'. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 27, No. 8, pp. 775-
810. For specific aspects of management accounting research that applies quantitative methodology, read: 
Bisbe, J., J.-M. Batista-Foguet and  R. Chenhall (2007), 'Defining management accounting constructs: A 
methodological note on the risks of conceptual misspecification'. Ibid.Vol. 32, No. 7-8, pp. 789-820.  
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which public sector organisations can institutionalise competitive tendering mechanisms 
to save the increasing costs of public services.  
 
Essay 4 shows how accounting information institutionalised within an organisation can 
be instrumental in organisational decision making and a circuit of power in negotiations 
of inter-organisational relationships during competition in the public sector. A policy 
implication is to apply a careful approach to the relevance of institutionalising price 
competition in specific areas, such as public health care, in countries that have a welfare 
tradition such as Finland. A relevant next step is to analyse in further research 
institutional roles of internal auditors to monitor public procurement processes and price 
setting strategies in competitive tendering. 
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which public sector organisations can institutionalise competitive tendering mechanisms 
to save the increasing costs of public services.  
 
Essay 4 shows how accounting information institutionalised within an organisation can 
be instrumental in organisational decision making and a circuit of power in negotiations 
of inter-organisational relationships during competition in the public sector. A policy 
implication is to apply a careful approach to the relevance of institutionalising price 
competition in specific areas, such as public health care, in countries that have a welfare 
tradition such as Finland. A relevant next step is to analyse in further research 
institutional roles of internal auditors to monitor public procurement processes and price 
setting strategies in competitive tendering. 
  
 
 
31 
 
 
References 
 
Ahrens, T. (1996), 'Styles of accountability'. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 21, 
No. 2–3, pp. 139-173. 
Ahrens, T. and C. S. Chapman (2006), 'Doing qualitative field research in management 
accounting: Positioning data to contribute to theory'. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, Vol. 31, No. 8, pp. 819-841. 
Al-Amoudi, I. and H. Willmott (2011), 'Where constructionism and critical realism 
converge: Interrogating the domain of epistemological relativism'. Organization 
Studies (01708406), Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 27-46. 
Almquist, R., G. Grossi, G. J. Van Helden and  C. Reichard (2013), 'Public sector 
governance and accountability'. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 24, No. 7-8, 
pp. 479-487. 
Argento, D., G. Grossi, T. Tagesson and  S.-O. Collin (2010), 'The externalisation of local 
public service delivery: Experience in Italy and Sweden'. International Journal of 
Public Policy, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 41-56. 
Arlbjørn, J. S. and P. V. Freytag (2012), 'Public procurement vs private purchasing: Is there 
any foundation for comparing and learning across the sectors?'. International 
Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 203-220. 
Backhouse, J., C. W. Hsu and  L. Silva (2006), 'Circuits of power in creating de jure 
standards: Shaping an international information systems security standard'. MIS 
Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. August, pp. 413-438. 
Barley, S. R. and P. S. Tolbert (1997), 'Institutionalization and structuration: Studying the 
links between action and institution'. Organization Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 93-
117. 
Basu, O. N., M. W. Dirsmith and  P. P. Gupta (1999), 'The coupling of the symbolic and the 
technical in an institutionalized context: The negotiated order of the GAO's audit 
reporting process'. American Sociological Review, Vol. 64, No. 4, pp. 506-526. 
Baxter, J. A. and W. F. Chua (1998), 'Doing field research: Practice and meta-theory in 
counterpoint'. Journal of Management Accounting Research, Vol. 10, pp. 69-87. 
------ (2008), 'The field researcher as author-writer'. Qualitative Research in Accounting & 
Management, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 101-121. 
Berger, P. and L. Luckmann (1967), The social construction of reality, (Doubleday, New 
York). 
Bergman, M. A. and S. Lundberg (2013), 'Tender evaluation and supplier selection 
methods in public procurement'. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, Vol. 
19, No. 2, pp. 73-83. 
Bhaskar, R. (1975), A realist theory of science, (Leeds Books, Leeds). 
------ (2011), Reclaiming reality: A critical introduction to contemporary philosophy, 
(Routhledge, London). 
Bisbe, J., J.-M. Batista-Foguet and  R. Chenhall (2007), 'Defining management accounting 
constructs: A methodological note on the risks of conceptual misspecification'. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 32, No. 7-8, pp. 789-820. 
Brennan, N. M. and J. Solomon (2008), 'Corporate governance, accountability and 
mechanisms of accountability: An overview'. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, Vol. 21, No. 7, pp. 885-906. 
 
 
32 
Broadbent, J., M. Dietrich and  R. Laughlin (1996), 'The development of principal–agent, 
contracting and accountability relationships in the public sector: Conceptual and 
cultural problems'. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 259-284. 
Broadbent, J., C. Gallop and  R. Laughlin (2010), 'Analysing societal regulatory control 
systems with specific reference to higher education in England'. Accounting, 
Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 506-531. 
Broadbent, J., J. Gill and  R. Laughlin (2008), 'Identifying and controlling risk: The 
problem of uncertainty in the private finance initiative in the UK's national health 
service'. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 40-78. 
Broadbent, J. and J. Guthrie (2008), 'Public sector to public services: 20 years of 
“contextual” accounting research'. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 
Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 129-169. 
Broadbent, J., K. Jacobs and  R. Laughlin (2001), 'Organisational resistance strategies to 
unwanted accounting and finance changes: The case of general medical practice in 
the UK'. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 14, No. 5, pp. 565-586. 
Broadbent, J. and R. Laughlin (1997), 'Developing empirical research: An example 
informed by a habermasian approach'. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, Vol. 10, No. 5, pp. 622-648. 
------ (2013), Accounting control and controlling accounting: Interdisciplinary and critical 
perspectives, 1 edn., (Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley). 
Broadbent, J., R. Laughlin and  S. Read (1991), 'Recent financial and administrative 
changes in the NHS: A critical theory analysis'. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 
Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 1-29. 
Burns, J. (2000), 'The dynamics of accounting change inter-play between new practices, 
routines, institutions, power and politics'. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, Vol. 13, No. 5, pp. 566-596. 
Burns, J. and R. W. Scapens (2000), 'Conceptualizing management accounting change: An 
institutional framework'. Management Accounting Research, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 3-25. 
Busco, C., A. Riccaboni and  R. W. Scapens (2006), 'Trust for accounting and accounting 
for trust'. Management Accounting Research, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 11-41. 
Bush, P. D. (1987), 'The theory of institutional change'. Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 21, 
No. 3, pp. 1075-1116. 
Butler, J. (2005), Giving an account of oneself, (Fordham University Press, New York). 
Carter, C., S. Clegg and  M. Kornberger (2010), 'Re-framing strategy: Power, politics and 
accounting'. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 23, No. 5, pp. 573-
594. 
Clegg, S. (1989), Frameworks of power, (Sage Publications, London). 
Coad, A. F. and J. Cullen (2006), 'Inter-organisational cost management: Towards an 
evolutionary perspective'. Management Accounting Research, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 342-
369. 
Coase, R. H. (1937), 'The nature of the firm'. Economica, Vol. 4, No. 16, pp. 386-405. 
Collier, P. M. (2001), 'The power of accounting: A field study of local financial 
management in a police force'. Management Accounting Research, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 
465-486. 
Coyte, R., D. Emsley and  D. Boyd (2010), 'Examining management accounting change as 
rules and routines: The effect of rule precision'. Australian Accounting Review, Vol. 
20, No. 2, pp. 96-109. 
Danermark, B., M. Ekström, L. Jakobsen and  J. C. Karlsson (1997), Explaining society: 
Critical realism in social sciences, (Routledge, London). 
 
 
33 
Davenport, S. and S. Leitch (2005), 'Circuits of power in practice: Strategic ambiguity as 
delegation of authority'. Organization Studies, Vol. 26, No. 11, pp. 1603-1623. 
Dillard, J., F. , J. Rigsby, T.  and  C. Goodman (2004), 'The making and remaking of 
organization context: Duality and the institutionalization process'. Accounting, 
Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 506-542. 
Dimaggio, P. J. and W. W. Powell (1983), 'The iron cage revisited: Institutional 
isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields'. American 
Sociological Review, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 147-160. 
Downey, S. (2005), 'From simulation model to critique of structuration'. Structure and 
Dynamics, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 1-27. 
Dugger, W. (1990), 'The new institutionalism: New but not institutionalist'. Journal of 
Economic Issues, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 423-431. 
Dul, J. and T. Hak (2008), Case study methodology in business research, (Butterworth-
Heinemann, London). 
Ezzamel, M., K. Robson, P. Stapleton and  C. McLean (2007), 'Discourse and institutional 
change: 'Giving accounts' and accountability'. Management Accounting Research, 
Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 150-171. 
Fleetwood, S. (2004), 'An ontology for organizations and management studies', in S. 
Fleetwood & S. Ackroyd (eds), Critical realist applications in organisation and 
management studies, (Routledge, London). 
------ (2005), 'Ontology in organization and management studies: A critical realist 
perspective'. Organization, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 197-222. 
Foucault, M. (1991), Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison, (Penguin Books, London). 
Giddens, A. (1984), Constitution of society, (University of California Press, California). 
Greiling, D. and K. Spraul (2010), 'Accountability and challenges of information 
disclosure'. Public Administration Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 338-377. 
Grossi, G. and R. Mussari (2008), 'Effects of outsourcing on performance measurement 
and reporting: The experience of Italian local governments'. Public Budgeting & 
Finance, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 22-38. 
Habermas, J. (1984), The theory of communicative action: Reason and the rationalization of 
society, (Beacon Press, Boston). 
------ (1987), The theory of communicative action: Lifeworld and system, a critique of 
             functionalist reason, (Beacon Press, Boston, Massachusetts). 
------ (2006), 'Political communication in media society: Does democracy still enjoy an 
epistemic dimension? The impact of normative theory on empirical research'. 
Communication Theory, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 411-426. 
Häkkinen, U. and J. Lehto (2005), 'Reform, change, and continuity in Finnish health care'. 
Journal of Health Politics Policy and Law, Vol. 30, No. 1-2, pp. 79-96. 
Hamilton, W. H. (1932), 'Institutions', in E. R. A. Seligman & A. Johnson (eds), 
Encycloapedia of social sciences, (MacMillan, New York). 
Hardy, C. (1996), 'Understanding power: Bringing about strategic change'. British Journal 
of Management, Vol. 7, No. 1. 
Hassel, L. G. and G. M. Cunningham (2004), 'Psychic distance and budget control of 
foreign subsidiaries'. Journal of International Accounting Research, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 
79-93. 
Hodgson, G. M. (1993), Introduction to the economics of institutions, (Edward Elgar, 
Aldershot). 
Hodgson, G. M. (2006), 'What are institutions?'. Journal of Economic Issues (Association for 
Evolutionary Economics), Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 1-25. 
 
 
32 
Broadbent, J., M. Dietrich and  R. Laughlin (1996), 'The development of principal–agent, 
contracting and accountability relationships in the public sector: Conceptual and 
cultural problems'. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 259-284. 
Broadbent, J., C. Gallop and  R. Laughlin (2010), 'Analysing societal regulatory control 
systems with specific reference to higher education in England'. Accounting, 
Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 506-531. 
Broadbent, J., J. Gill and  R. Laughlin (2008), 'Identifying and controlling risk: The 
problem of uncertainty in the private finance initiative in the UK's national health 
service'. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 40-78. 
Broadbent, J. and J. Guthrie (2008), 'Public sector to public services: 20 years of 
“contextual” accounting research'. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 
Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 129-169. 
Broadbent, J., K. Jacobs and  R. Laughlin (2001), 'Organisational resistance strategies to 
unwanted accounting and finance changes: The case of general medical practice in 
the UK'. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 14, No. 5, pp. 565-586. 
Broadbent, J. and R. Laughlin (1997), 'Developing empirical research: An example 
informed by a habermasian approach'. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, Vol. 10, No. 5, pp. 622-648. 
------ (2013), Accounting control and controlling accounting: Interdisciplinary and critical 
perspectives, 1 edn., (Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley). 
Broadbent, J., R. Laughlin and  S. Read (1991), 'Recent financial and administrative 
changes in the NHS: A critical theory analysis'. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 
Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 1-29. 
Burns, J. (2000), 'The dynamics of accounting change inter-play between new practices, 
routines, institutions, power and politics'. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, Vol. 13, No. 5, pp. 566-596. 
Burns, J. and R. W. Scapens (2000), 'Conceptualizing management accounting change: An 
institutional framework'. Management Accounting Research, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 3-25. 
Busco, C., A. Riccaboni and  R. W. Scapens (2006), 'Trust for accounting and accounting 
for trust'. Management Accounting Research, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 11-41. 
Bush, P. D. (1987), 'The theory of institutional change'. Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 21, 
No. 3, pp. 1075-1116. 
Butler, J. (2005), Giving an account of oneself, (Fordham University Press, New York). 
Carter, C., S. Clegg and  M. Kornberger (2010), 'Re-framing strategy: Power, politics and 
accounting'. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 23, No. 5, pp. 573-
594. 
Clegg, S. (1989), Frameworks of power, (Sage Publications, London). 
Coad, A. F. and J. Cullen (2006), 'Inter-organisational cost management: Towards an 
evolutionary perspective'. Management Accounting Research, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 342-
369. 
Coase, R. H. (1937), 'The nature of the firm'. Economica, Vol. 4, No. 16, pp. 386-405. 
Collier, P. M. (2001), 'The power of accounting: A field study of local financial 
management in a police force'. Management Accounting Research, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 
465-486. 
Coyte, R., D. Emsley and  D. Boyd (2010), 'Examining management accounting change as 
rules and routines: The effect of rule precision'. Australian Accounting Review, Vol. 
20, No. 2, pp. 96-109. 
Danermark, B., M. Ekström, L. Jakobsen and  J. C. Karlsson (1997), Explaining society: 
Critical realism in social sciences, (Routledge, London). 
 
 
33 
Davenport, S. and S. Leitch (2005), 'Circuits of power in practice: Strategic ambiguity as 
delegation of authority'. Organization Studies, Vol. 26, No. 11, pp. 1603-1623. 
Dillard, J., F. , J. Rigsby, T.  and  C. Goodman (2004), 'The making and remaking of 
organization context: Duality and the institutionalization process'. Accounting, 
Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 506-542. 
Dimaggio, P. J. and W. W. Powell (1983), 'The iron cage revisited: Institutional 
isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields'. American 
Sociological Review, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 147-160. 
Downey, S. (2005), 'From simulation model to critique of structuration'. Structure and 
Dynamics, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 1-27. 
Dugger, W. (1990), 'The new institutionalism: New but not institutionalist'. Journal of 
Economic Issues, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 423-431. 
Dul, J. and T. Hak (2008), Case study methodology in business research, (Butterworth-
Heinemann, London). 
Ezzamel, M., K. Robson, P. Stapleton and  C. McLean (2007), 'Discourse and institutional 
change: 'Giving accounts' and accountability'. Management Accounting Research, 
Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 150-171. 
Fleetwood, S. (2004), 'An ontology for organizations and management studies', in S. 
Fleetwood & S. Ackroyd (eds), Critical realist applications in organisation and 
management studies, (Routledge, London). 
------ (2005), 'Ontology in organization and management studies: A critical realist 
perspective'. Organization, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 197-222. 
Foucault, M. (1991), Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison, (Penguin Books, London). 
Giddens, A. (1984), Constitution of society, (University of California Press, California). 
Greiling, D. and K. Spraul (2010), 'Accountability and challenges of information 
disclosure'. Public Administration Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 338-377. 
Grossi, G. and R. Mussari (2008), 'Effects of outsourcing on performance measurement 
and reporting: The experience of Italian local governments'. Public Budgeting & 
Finance, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 22-38. 
Habermas, J. (1984), The theory of communicative action: Reason and the rationalization of 
society, (Beacon Press, Boston). 
------ (1987), The theory of communicative action: Lifeworld and system, a critique of 
             functionalist reason, (Beacon Press, Boston, Massachusetts). 
------ (2006), 'Political communication in media society: Does democracy still enjoy an 
epistemic dimension? The impact of normative theory on empirical research'. 
Communication Theory, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 411-426. 
Häkkinen, U. and J. Lehto (2005), 'Reform, change, and continuity in Finnish health care'. 
Journal of Health Politics Policy and Law, Vol. 30, No. 1-2, pp. 79-96. 
Hamilton, W. H. (1932), 'Institutions', in E. R. A. Seligman & A. Johnson (eds), 
Encycloapedia of social sciences, (MacMillan, New York). 
Hardy, C. (1996), 'Understanding power: Bringing about strategic change'. British Journal 
of Management, Vol. 7, No. 1. 
Hassel, L. G. and G. M. Cunningham (2004), 'Psychic distance and budget control of 
foreign subsidiaries'. Journal of International Accounting Research, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 
79-93. 
Hodgson, G. M. (1993), Introduction to the economics of institutions, (Edward Elgar, 
Aldershot). 
Hodgson, G. M. (2006), 'What are institutions?'. Journal of Economic Issues (Association for 
Evolutionary Economics), Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 1-25. 
 
 
34 
Hyndman, N. and P. McDonnell (2009), 'Governance and charities: An exploration of key 
themes and the development of a research agenda'. Financial Accountability & 
Management, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 5-31. 
Hyvönen, T. and J. Järvinen (2006), 'Contract-based budgeting in health care: A study of 
the institutional processes of accounting change'. European Accounting Review, Vol. 
15, No. 1, pp. 3-16. 
Jacobs, K. (2005), 'Hybridisation or polarisation: Doctors and accounting in the U.K., 
Germany and Italy'. Financial Accountability & Management, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 135-
162. 
Järvinen, J. (2006), 'Institutional pressures for adopting new cost accounting systems in 
finnish hospitals: Two longitudinal case studies'. Financial Accountability & 
Management, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 21-46. 
Johansson, T. and S. Siverbo (2009), 'Why is research on management accounting change 
not explicitly evolutionary? Taking the next step in the conceptualisation of 
management accounting change'. Management Accounting Research, Vol. 20, No. 2, 
pp. 146-162. 
Johnston, P. (2004), 'Outflanking power, reframing unionism: The basic strike of 1999-
2001'. Labor Studies Journal, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 1-24. 
Kurunmäki, L. (1999a), 'Making an accounting entity: The case of the hospital in Finnish 
health care reforms'. European Accounting Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 219-237. 
------ (1999b), 'Professional vs financial capital in the field of health care - struggles for the 
redistribution of power and control'. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 24, 
No. 2, pp. 95-124. 
------ (2004), 'A hybrid profession - the acquisition of management accounting expertise by 
medical professionals'. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 29, No. 3-4, pp. 
327-347. 
Langlois, R. N. (1989), 'What was wrong with the old institutional economics (and what is 
still wrong with the new)?'. Review of Political Economy, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 270-298. 
Lapsley, I. (2001), 'The accounting-clinical interface - implementing budgets for hospital 
doctors'. Abacus, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 79-109. 
Lapsley, I., A. Midwinter, T. Nambiar and  I. Steccolini (2011), 'Government budgeting, 
power and negotiated order'. Management Accounting Research, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 
16-25. 
Laughlin, R. C. (1987), 'Accounting systems in organisational contexts: A case for critical 
theory'. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 12, No. 5, pp. 479-502. 
Layder, D. (1993), New strategies in social research, (Polity Press, Cambridge). 
Lehman, G. (2006), 'Perspectives on language, accountability and critical accounting: An 
interpretative perspective'. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 17, No. 6, pp. 
755-779. 
Lehtonen, T. (2007), 'DRG-based prospective pricing and case-mix accounting - exploring 
the mechanisms of successful implementation'. Management Accounting Research, 
Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 367-395. 
Libby, R., R. Bloomfield and  M. W. Nelson (2002), 'Experimental research in financial 
accounting'. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 27, No. 8, pp. 775-810. 
Liguori, M. (2012), 'Radical change, accounting and public sector reforms: A comparison 
of Italian and Canadian municipalities'. Financial Accountability & Management, 
Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 437-463. 
Liguori, M. and I. Steccolini (2011), 'Accounting change: Explaining the outcomes, 
interpreting the process'. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 25, No. 
1, pp. 27-70. 
 
 
35 
Linnakko, E. and J. Back (1994), 'From planning to market allocation in Finnish health 
care', in A. Alban & T. Christiansen (eds), Nordic lights: New initiatives in health care 
systems, (Odense University Press, Odense). 
Lucas, M. and J. Rafferty (2008), 'Cost analysis for pricing: Exploring the gap between 
theory and practice'. The British Accounting Review, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 148-160. 
Lukes, S. (1974), Power: A radical view, (MacMillan, London). 
Lukka, K. (2007), 'Management accounting change and stability: Loosely coupled rules 
and routines in action'. Management Accounting Research, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 76-101. 
Lukka, K. (2010), 'The roles and effects of paradigms in accounting research'. Management 
Accounting Research, Vol. 21, No. 2, p. 110. 
Macinati, M. S. (2010), 'NPM reforms and the perception of budget by hospital clinicians: 
Lessons from two case-studies'. Financial Accountability & Management, Vol. 26, No. 
4, pp. 422-442. 
Macintosh, N. B. and P. Quattrone (2010), Management accounting and control systems: An 
organizational and sociological approach, 2 edn., ( J. Wiley., New York). 
Maines, D. R. (1982), 'In search of mesostructure: Studies in negotiated order'. Journal of 
Contemporary Ethnography   Vol. 11 (october), pp. 267-279. 
Messner, M. (2009), 'The limits of accountability'. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
Vol. 34, No. 8, pp. 918-938. 
Meyer, J. W. and B. Rowan (1977), 'Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as 
myth and ceremony'. American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 83, No. 2, pp. 340-363. 
Modell, S. (2006), 'Institutional and negotiated order perspectives on cost allocations: The 
case of the Swedish university sector'. European Accounting Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, 
pp. 219-251. 
------ (2009), 'In defence of triangulation: A critical realist approach to mixed methods 
research in management accounting'. Management Accounting Research, Vol. 20, No. 
3, pp. 208-221. 
Mossialos, E., G. Permanand and  R. Baeten (2010), Health systems governance in Europe: The 
role of european union law and policy, (Cambridge University Press). 
Mulgan, R. (2000), '‘Accountability’: An ever-expanding concept?'. Public Administration, 
Vol. 78, No. 3, pp. 555-573. 
Nahapiet, J. (1988), 'The rhetoric and reality of an accounting change: A study of resource 
allocation'. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 333-358. 
Näsi, S. (1999), Kunnan kirjanpitouudistus [Municipal accounting reform], (Kunnallisalan 
kehittämissäätiö, Helsinki). 
Newton, T., S. Deetz and  M. Reed (2011), 'Responses to social constructionism and critical 
realism in organization studies'. Organization Studies (01708406), Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 
7-26. 
Nyland, K. and I. J. Pettersen (2004), 'The control gap: The role of budgets, accounting 
information and (non-) decisions in hospital settings'. Financial Accountability & 
Management, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 77-102. 
Nyland, K., I. J. Pettersen and  K. Östergren (2009), 'Same reform – different practices?: 
How regional health enterprises adjust to management control reforms'. Journal of 
Accounting & Organizational Change, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 35-61. 
Oliver, C. (1991), 'Strategic responses to institutional processes'. Academy of Management 
Review, Vol. 16, No. 1, p. 145. 
Parhankangas, A., D. Ing, D. L. Hawk, G. Dane and  M. Kosits (2005), 'Negotiated order 
and network form organizations'. Systems Research and Behavioral Science, Vol. 22, 
No. 5, pp. 431-452. 
 
 
34 
Hyndman, N. and P. McDonnell (2009), 'Governance and charities: An exploration of key 
themes and the development of a research agenda'. Financial Accountability & 
Management, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 5-31. 
Hyvönen, T. and J. Järvinen (2006), 'Contract-based budgeting in health care: A study of 
the institutional processes of accounting change'. European Accounting Review, Vol. 
15, No. 1, pp. 3-16. 
Jacobs, K. (2005), 'Hybridisation or polarisation: Doctors and accounting in the U.K., 
Germany and Italy'. Financial Accountability & Management, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 135-
162. 
Järvinen, J. (2006), 'Institutional pressures for adopting new cost accounting systems in 
finnish hospitals: Two longitudinal case studies'. Financial Accountability & 
Management, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 21-46. 
Johansson, T. and S. Siverbo (2009), 'Why is research on management accounting change 
not explicitly evolutionary? Taking the next step in the conceptualisation of 
management accounting change'. Management Accounting Research, Vol. 20, No. 2, 
pp. 146-162. 
Johnston, P. (2004), 'Outflanking power, reframing unionism: The basic strike of 1999-
2001'. Labor Studies Journal, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 1-24. 
Kurunmäki, L. (1999a), 'Making an accounting entity: The case of the hospital in Finnish 
health care reforms'. European Accounting Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 219-237. 
------ (1999b), 'Professional vs financial capital in the field of health care - struggles for the 
redistribution of power and control'. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 24, 
No. 2, pp. 95-124. 
------ (2004), 'A hybrid profession - the acquisition of management accounting expertise by 
medical professionals'. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 29, No. 3-4, pp. 
327-347. 
Langlois, R. N. (1989), 'What was wrong with the old institutional economics (and what is 
still wrong with the new)?'. Review of Political Economy, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 270-298. 
Lapsley, I. (2001), 'The accounting-clinical interface - implementing budgets for hospital 
doctors'. Abacus, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 79-109. 
Lapsley, I., A. Midwinter, T. Nambiar and  I. Steccolini (2011), 'Government budgeting, 
power and negotiated order'. Management Accounting Research, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 
16-25. 
Laughlin, R. C. (1987), 'Accounting systems in organisational contexts: A case for critical 
theory'. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 12, No. 5, pp. 479-502. 
Layder, D. (1993), New strategies in social research, (Polity Press, Cambridge). 
Lehman, G. (2006), 'Perspectives on language, accountability and critical accounting: An 
interpretative perspective'. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 17, No. 6, pp. 
755-779. 
Lehtonen, T. (2007), 'DRG-based prospective pricing and case-mix accounting - exploring 
the mechanisms of successful implementation'. Management Accounting Research, 
Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 367-395. 
Libby, R., R. Bloomfield and  M. W. Nelson (2002), 'Experimental research in financial 
accounting'. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 27, No. 8, pp. 775-810. 
Liguori, M. (2012), 'Radical change, accounting and public sector reforms: A comparison 
of Italian and Canadian municipalities'. Financial Accountability & Management, 
Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 437-463. 
Liguori, M. and I. Steccolini (2011), 'Accounting change: Explaining the outcomes, 
interpreting the process'. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 25, No. 
1, pp. 27-70. 
 
 
35 
Linnakko, E. and J. Back (1994), 'From planning to market allocation in Finnish health 
care', in A. Alban & T. Christiansen (eds), Nordic lights: New initiatives in health care 
systems, (Odense University Press, Odense). 
Lucas, M. and J. Rafferty (2008), 'Cost analysis for pricing: Exploring the gap between 
theory and practice'. The British Accounting Review, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 148-160. 
Lukes, S. (1974), Power: A radical view, (MacMillan, London). 
Lukka, K. (2007), 'Management accounting change and stability: Loosely coupled rules 
and routines in action'. Management Accounting Research, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 76-101. 
Lukka, K. (2010), 'The roles and effects of paradigms in accounting research'. Management 
Accounting Research, Vol. 21, No. 2, p. 110. 
Macinati, M. S. (2010), 'NPM reforms and the perception of budget by hospital clinicians: 
Lessons from two case-studies'. Financial Accountability & Management, Vol. 26, No. 
4, pp. 422-442. 
Macintosh, N. B. and P. Quattrone (2010), Management accounting and control systems: An 
organizational and sociological approach, 2 edn., ( J. Wiley., New York). 
Maines, D. R. (1982), 'In search of mesostructure: Studies in negotiated order'. Journal of 
Contemporary Ethnography   Vol. 11 (october), pp. 267-279. 
Messner, M. (2009), 'The limits of accountability'. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
Vol. 34, No. 8, pp. 918-938. 
Meyer, J. W. and B. Rowan (1977), 'Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as 
myth and ceremony'. American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 83, No. 2, pp. 340-363. 
Modell, S. (2006), 'Institutional and negotiated order perspectives on cost allocations: The 
case of the Swedish university sector'. European Accounting Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, 
pp. 219-251. 
------ (2009), 'In defence of triangulation: A critical realist approach to mixed methods 
research in management accounting'. Management Accounting Research, Vol. 20, No. 
3, pp. 208-221. 
Mossialos, E., G. Permanand and  R. Baeten (2010), Health systems governance in Europe: The 
role of european union law and policy, (Cambridge University Press). 
Mulgan, R. (2000), '‘Accountability’: An ever-expanding concept?'. Public Administration, 
Vol. 78, No. 3, pp. 555-573. 
Nahapiet, J. (1988), 'The rhetoric and reality of an accounting change: A study of resource 
allocation'. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 333-358. 
Näsi, S. (1999), Kunnan kirjanpitouudistus [Municipal accounting reform], (Kunnallisalan 
kehittämissäätiö, Helsinki). 
Newton, T., S. Deetz and  M. Reed (2011), 'Responses to social constructionism and critical 
realism in organization studies'. Organization Studies (01708406), Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 
7-26. 
Nyland, K. and I. J. Pettersen (2004), 'The control gap: The role of budgets, accounting 
information and (non-) decisions in hospital settings'. Financial Accountability & 
Management, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 77-102. 
Nyland, K., I. J. Pettersen and  K. Östergren (2009), 'Same reform – different practices?: 
How regional health enterprises adjust to management control reforms'. Journal of 
Accounting & Organizational Change, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 35-61. 
Oliver, C. (1991), 'Strategic responses to institutional processes'. Academy of Management 
Review, Vol. 16, No. 1, p. 145. 
Parhankangas, A., D. Ing, D. L. Hawk, G. Dane and  M. Kosits (2005), 'Negotiated order 
and network form organizations'. Systems Research and Behavioral Science, Vol. 22, 
No. 5, pp. 431-452. 
 
 
36 
Pedersen, E. R. G. and H. Mahad (2011), 'Determinants of lean success and failure in the 
Danish public sector: A negotiated order perspective'. International Journal of Public 
Sector Management, Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 403-420. 
Pettersen, I. J. (2001), 'Implementing management accounting reforms in the public sector: 
The difficult journey from intentions to effects'. European Accounting Review, Vol. 
10, No. 3, pp. 561-581. 
Rahaman, A. S. and S. Lawrence (2001), 'A negotiated order perspective on public sector 
accounting and financial control'. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 
Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 147-165. 
Reed, M. (2005), 'Reflections on the 'realist turn' in organization and management studies'. 
Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 42, No. 8, pp. 1621-1644. 
Ribeiro, J. A. and R. W. Scapens (2006), 'Institutional theories in management accounting 
change: Contributions, issues and paths for development'. Qualitative Research in 
Accounting & Management, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 94-111. 
Roberts, J. (2001), 'Trust and control in anglo-american systems of corporate governance: 
The individualizing and socializing effects of processes of accountability'. Human 
Relations, Vol. 54, No. 12, pp. 1547-1572. 
------ (2009), 'No one is perfect: The limits of transparency and an ethic for ['intelligent'] 
accountability'. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 34, No. 8, pp. 957-970. 
Roberts, J. and R. Scapens (1985), 'Accounting systems and systems of accountability - 
understanding accounting practices in their organisational contexts'. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 443-456. 
Ross, A. and M. Chiasson (2011), 'Habermas and information systems research: New 
directions'. Information and Organization, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 123-141. 
Rutherford, M. (2000), 'Understanding institutional economics: 1918–1929'. Journal of the 
History of Economic Thought, Vol. 22, No. 03, pp. 277-308. 
Sayer, R. A. (1992), Method in social science: A realist approach, (Routledge, London). 
------ (2000), Realism and social science, (Sage Publications Ltd, London). 
Scapens, R. (1994), 'Never mind the gap: Towards an institutional perspective on 
management accounting practice'. Management Accounting Research, Vol. 5, No. 3-4, 
pp. 301-21. 
------ (2006), 'Understanding management accounting practices – A personal journey'. 
British Accounting Review, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 1-30. 
Scapens, R. and E. Varoutsa (2010), 'Accounting in inter-organisation relationships: The 
institutional theory perspective', in H. Håkansson, K. Kraus & J. Lind (eds), 
Accounting in networks, (Routledge, London). 
Seal, W., A. Berry and  J. Cullen (2004), 'Disembedding the supply chain: Institutionalized 
reflexivity and inter-firm accounting'. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 
29, No. 1, pp. 73-92. 
Shaoul, J., A. Stafford and  P. Stapleton (2012), 'Accountability and corporate governance 
of public private partnerships'. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 23, No. 3, 
pp. 213-229. 
Silva, L. and J. Backhouse (2003), 'The circuits-of-power framework for studying power in 
institutionalization of information systems'. Journal of the Association for Information 
Systems, Vol. 4, pp. 294-336. 
Sinclair, A. (1995), 'The chameleon of accountability: Forms and discourses'. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, Vol. 20, No. 2-3, pp. 219-237. 
Smith, S., D. Winchester, D. Bunker and  R. Jamieson (2010), 'Circuits of power: A study of 
mandated compliance to an information systems security de jure standard in A 
government organization'. MIS Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 463-486. 
 
 
37 
Stewart, J. D. (1984), 'The role of information in public accountability', in A. G. Hopwood 
& C. R. Tomkins (eds), Issues in public sector accounting, (Philip Allan, London). 
Strauss, A. L. (1978), Negotiations: Varieties, contexts, processes and social order, (Ca: Jossey-
Bass, San Francisco). 
------ (1982), 'Interorganizational negotiation'. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, Vol. 11, 
No. 3, pp. 350-367. 
Tolbert, P. and L. Zucker (1999), 'The institutionalization of institutional theory', in S. 
Clegg & C. Hardy (eds), Studying organization: Theory & method., (Sage Publications 
Ltd, London). 
Tynkkynen, L.-K., J. Lehto and  S. Miettinen (2012), 'Framing the decision to contract out 
elderly care and primary health care services – perspectives of local level 
politicians and civil servants in Finland'. BMC Health Services Research, Vol. 12, No. 
1, pp. 1-12. 
Veblen, T. (1898), 'Why is economics not an evolutionary science?'. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 373-397. 
------ (1919), The place of science in modern civilizations and other essays, (Viking Press, New 
York). 
Vinnari, E. M. and S. Näsi (2008), 'Creative accrual accounting in the public sector: 
‘Milking’ water utilities to balance municipal budgets and accounts'. Financial 
Accountability & Management, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 97-116. 
Yazdifar, H., M. Zaman, M. Tsamenyi and  D. Askarany (2008), 'Management accounting 
change in a subsidiary organisation'. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 19, 
No. 3, pp. 404-430. 
Yin, R. (2008), Case study research - design and methods, 4th edn., (Sage Thousand Oaks, 
California). 
 
 
 
36 
Pedersen, E. R. G. and H. Mahad (2011), 'Determinants of lean success and failure in the 
Danish public sector: A negotiated order perspective'. International Journal of Public 
Sector Management, Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 403-420. 
Pettersen, I. J. (2001), 'Implementing management accounting reforms in the public sector: 
The difficult journey from intentions to effects'. European Accounting Review, Vol. 
10, No. 3, pp. 561-581. 
Rahaman, A. S. and S. Lawrence (2001), 'A negotiated order perspective on public sector 
accounting and financial control'. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 
Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 147-165. 
Reed, M. (2005), 'Reflections on the 'realist turn' in organization and management studies'. 
Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 42, No. 8, pp. 1621-1644. 
Ribeiro, J. A. and R. W. Scapens (2006), 'Institutional theories in management accounting 
change: Contributions, issues and paths for development'. Qualitative Research in 
Accounting & Management, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 94-111. 
Roberts, J. (2001), 'Trust and control in anglo-american systems of corporate governance: 
The individualizing and socializing effects of processes of accountability'. Human 
Relations, Vol. 54, No. 12, pp. 1547-1572. 
------ (2009), 'No one is perfect: The limits of transparency and an ethic for ['intelligent'] 
accountability'. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 34, No. 8, pp. 957-970. 
Roberts, J. and R. Scapens (1985), 'Accounting systems and systems of accountability - 
understanding accounting practices in their organisational contexts'. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 443-456. 
Ross, A. and M. Chiasson (2011), 'Habermas and information systems research: New 
directions'. Information and Organization, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 123-141. 
Rutherford, M. (2000), 'Understanding institutional economics: 1918–1929'. Journal of the 
History of Economic Thought, Vol. 22, No. 03, pp. 277-308. 
Sayer, R. A. (1992), Method in social science: A realist approach, (Routledge, London). 
------ (2000), Realism and social science, (Sage Publications Ltd, London). 
Scapens, R. (1994), 'Never mind the gap: Towards an institutional perspective on 
management accounting practice'. Management Accounting Research, Vol. 5, No. 3-4, 
pp. 301-21. 
------ (2006), 'Understanding management accounting practices – A personal journey'. 
British Accounting Review, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 1-30. 
Scapens, R. and E. Varoutsa (2010), 'Accounting in inter-organisation relationships: The 
institutional theory perspective', in H. Håkansson, K. Kraus & J. Lind (eds), 
Accounting in networks, (Routledge, London). 
Seal, W., A. Berry and  J. Cullen (2004), 'Disembedding the supply chain: Institutionalized 
reflexivity and inter-firm accounting'. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 
29, No. 1, pp. 73-92. 
Shaoul, J., A. Stafford and  P. Stapleton (2012), 'Accountability and corporate governance 
of public private partnerships'. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 23, No. 3, 
pp. 213-229. 
Silva, L. and J. Backhouse (2003), 'The circuits-of-power framework for studying power in 
institutionalization of information systems'. Journal of the Association for Information 
Systems, Vol. 4, pp. 294-336. 
Sinclair, A. (1995), 'The chameleon of accountability: Forms and discourses'. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, Vol. 20, No. 2-3, pp. 219-237. 
Smith, S., D. Winchester, D. Bunker and  R. Jamieson (2010), 'Circuits of power: A study of 
mandated compliance to an information systems security de jure standard in A 
government organization'. MIS Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 463-486. 
 
 
37 
Stewart, J. D. (1984), 'The role of information in public accountability', in A. G. Hopwood 
& C. R. Tomkins (eds), Issues in public sector accounting, (Philip Allan, London). 
Strauss, A. L. (1978), Negotiations: Varieties, contexts, processes and social order, (Ca: Jossey-
Bass, San Francisco). 
------ (1982), 'Interorganizational negotiation'. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, Vol. 11, 
No. 3, pp. 350-367. 
Tolbert, P. and L. Zucker (1999), 'The institutionalization of institutional theory', in S. 
Clegg & C. Hardy (eds), Studying organization: Theory & method., (Sage Publications 
Ltd, London). 
Tynkkynen, L.-K., J. Lehto and  S. Miettinen (2012), 'Framing the decision to contract out 
elderly care and primary health care services – perspectives of local level 
politicians and civil servants in Finland'. BMC Health Services Research, Vol. 12, No. 
1, pp. 1-12. 
Veblen, T. (1898), 'Why is economics not an evolutionary science?'. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 373-397. 
------ (1919), The place of science in modern civilizations and other essays, (Viking Press, New 
York). 
Vinnari, E. M. and S. Näsi (2008), 'Creative accrual accounting in the public sector: 
‘Milking’ water utilities to balance municipal budgets and accounts'. Financial 
Accountability & Management, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 97-116. 
Yazdifar, H., M. Zaman, M. Tsamenyi and  D. Askarany (2008), 'Management accounting 
change in a subsidiary organisation'. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 19, 
No. 3, pp. 404-430. 
Yin, R. (2008), Case study research - design and methods, 4th edn., (Sage Thousand Oaks, 
California). 
 
9 789521 230028
Jean Claude Mutiganda
Accounting for Competition, Governance 
and Accountability During Institutional 
Change in Not-for-profit and Public 
Sector Organisations
Jean C
laude M
utiganda | A
ccounting for C
om
petition, G
overnance and A
ccountability D
uring Institutional C
hange in N
ot-for-profit and Public Sector O
rganisations | 2014
ISBN 978-952-12-3002-8
Jean Claude Mutiganda
Accounting for Competition, 
Governance and Accountability During 
Institutional Change in Not-for-profit 
and Public Sector Organisations
Understanding the relationship between the institutionalisation 
of competitive tendering, governance, budgetary policies and 
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This doctoral thesis presents research that analyses this within 
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of management accounting change proposed by Burn and 
Scapens (2000). The framework shows how institutional change 
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tion process, power and accountability among organisational 
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negotiating order between organisations. The research uses a 
multiple theory approach, which provides effective conceptual 
tools to analyse how institutional actors think and act from dif-
ferent perspectives and in different settings. 
The empirical part of the thesis uses intensive field studies in 
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Findings are presented in four essays that support the theoreti-
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